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Article 3

Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux
Lani Guinier*
The Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. GoreI ostensibly protected
the rights of a single political candidate to the equal protection of the
laws. 2 It is consistent, in that sense, with other constitutional law cases
that focus on the abstract rights of individuals to something called
"equality." Yet, Bush v. Gore has secured a place in constitutional
jurisprudence without regard to legal doctrines in general or the doctrine
of equal protection in particular.
Certainly, its long-term significance is assured because the opinion
dramatically resolved a presidential election. Equally significant is the
Court's appropriation of the language of the Fourteenth Amendment,
enacted after the Civil War to protect the newly freed slaves, to express
an aristocratic, albeit inchoate, political philosophy: that hierarchy,
ratified by the holding of elections, equals democracy. Animated by a
passion for political stability, rather than political equality, the justices
in the majority deployed the Equal Protection Clause as a formal tool to
accomplish a goal that has little to do with noble ideas of political
equality and much to do with an elite-centered political orientation.
Indeed, the decision limited, rather than broadened, the concept of
equality as the Court sought to avoid its greatest fear: the nightmare of
too much democracy.
In Bush v. Gore, the majority granted to a single candidate with a
privileged pedigree rights that the Court has yet to accord the average
voter. The opinion was clear on this distinction-the protections
afforded applied only to George W. Bush in this instance. 3 Moreover,
* This Essay was initially delivered as an oral presentation at Loyola University Chicago
School of Law based on a chapter I wrote in the book, A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING
BUSH v. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

(Ronald Dworkin ed.,

2002). I have tried to retain the informal style appropriate to that venue, and with permission of
The New Press, have borrowed liberally from the original chapter, which was the source of my
oral remarks. Sam Spital, Harvard Law School Class of 2004, has contributed excellent research
and editorial assistance. His work has been invaluable to both these projects.
1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
2. See id. at Ill (per curiam).
3. Id. at 109 (per curiam) ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the
problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.").
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there was no comparable right for the voters. As the Court reminded us,
there is no constitutional right to vote. 4 Perceiving its role as the
guardian of what Justice O'Connor termed in another voting case
"stability and measured change," 5 the Court majority vindicated the
rights of a powerful individual. Yet, in other contexts, the same
majority has ignored the needs of the people as a whole to exercise their
power through equal and meaningful participation in political decisions
that shape their lives.
The implicit message of the Court's intervention was that democracy
is a domain of governing elites, not robust and engaged citizens.
Consistent with this view, Professor Richard Pildes sees increasing
evidence that the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence, and not just its
decision in Bush v. Gore, locates the center of gravity in our
political system in unelected federal judges rather than the people
themselves. 6 As Professor Pildes observes, "Bush v. Gore, for all its
uniqueness, is not an isolated event. It is best understood, instead,
as the most dramatic crystallization of a deeper, more enduring
pattern in the contemporary relationship between democratic politics
and constitutional law." 7
Pildes labels this phenomenon "the
constitutionalization of democracy," meaning that theories of
constitutional law have played an increasingly dominant role in shaping
our understanding of democracy. 8 Not surprisingly, such a view
asserts a central role for judges, whose intervention is needed to
protect the integrity of our political system from excessive factionalism
and political chaos. Professor Pildes has uncovered case after case in
which the majority of the Court sought to preserve the status quo
despite stunning evidence of popular disaffection with current
institutional arrangements. 9 Time and again, the measure of democracy
is its stability, not its flexibility; the maintenance of order triumphs over
efforts to combat declining levels of citizen participation.
This vision of democracy has two key consequences, which are the
focus of this Essay. First, it tolerates inequalities that continue to
disadvantage historically marginalized members of the polity, whose
role as second-class citizens or three-fifths of a person is part of our
4. Id. at 104 (per curiam).
5. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6. Richard Pildes, ConstitutionalizingDemocratic Politics, in A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION:
DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 155

Dworkin ed., 2002) [hereinafter Pildes, ConstitutionalizingDemocratic Politics].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 161-76.

(Ronald
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Second, it ignores the declining levels of
governing legacy.
participation even by people who might otherwise identify with the
"official portrait of the United States as the standard bearer of
10
democracy and representative government."'
Both of these troubling phenomena characterized the 2000
presidential election. In Florida, we witnessed the disenfranchisement
of people of color, elderly Jews, and those who had difficulty following
written instructions. Extremely low levels of participation across-theboard accompanied this outright exclusion of many voters. Indeed, one
of the most striking statistics about our political system is how poorly it
fosters participation in democracy's most basic act: voting. Of the
172 countries in the world that profess to be democracies, 81% have
higher levels of voter participation than the United States. I I Our
extraordinarily low turnout is especially disturbing since it is fueled by
even lower rates of working-class participation.
In Europe, the
difference between turnout levels among the affluent and low-income
voters range from 5% to 10%. 12 In the United States, more than twothirds of people with annual incomes greater than $50,000 vote,
compared with one-third of those with incomes under $10,000.13
Fewer than half of eligible Americans bother to vote in most
elections; levels of turnout are less than 30% in off years. 14 For many,
declining to vote is a rational choice based on the fact that the two-party
duopoly gerrymanders districts so that electoral outcomes are usually
decided before a single ballot is cast. People of color, poor people, and
women remain grossly underrepresented in legislative bodies and
policy-making influence. Additionally, money plays an unprecedented
role in political campaigns and supplies wealthy corporations, interest
groups, and individuals with a disproportionate share of political power.
10.

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 316-17 (2000).

11.

See INST. FOR DEMOCRACY

&

ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, VOTER TURNOUT: A GLOBAL

1945 TO DATE: A GLOBAL REPORT ON POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION, at http://www.idea.int/voter-turnout/voter-turnout2.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2002).
12. Lani Guinier, What We Must Overcome, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 12-26, 2001, at 28.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Derrick Jackson, Voting for Democracy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2002, at
A19, available at 2002 WL 4150053. Jackson said "we still hate voting" a year after September
11. Id.
Our turn outs, sinking below 20 percent in the primaries and rising to only 50 percent
in presidential elections, is nothing compared with elections elsewhere in the world this
year. Elections in Macedonia brought out 70 percent of the voters. Slovakia is
anticipating a 70 percent turnout this weekend. Lesotho, France, and the Netherlands
had respective turnouts of 68, 80, and 79 percent.
SURVEY:

VOTER

TURNOUT

FROM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

Disaffection with our current political system manifests itself in
individual isolation or withdrawal. However, dissatisfaction can supply
the impetus for social movements that provide an outlet for political
commitments, bring citizens together, and reverse the trend toward
declining turnout levels. Examples include the flourishing of voter
initiatives and the burgeoning of support for third political parties and
independent candidates. 15 These developments, especially those that
inspire interactive experiments in community organizing and political
involvement, have a complex set of causes and consequences, but on the
whole, they strike me as positive interventions to be encouraged rather
than crushed. Thus, the evidence of increasing discontent comes in
divergent forms: apathy and alienation on the one hand, citizen activism
on the other. Legal rules that enshrine the existing structure promote
the former and risk suppressing the latter, with potentially devastating
consequences for our democracy. As Judge Damon Keith writes in
regard to other government actions that attempt to leave the people
outside 16of the decision-making process, "Democracies die behind closed
doors."

Yet in the Court's constitutional canon, democracy seems to function
best when decisions are made behind closed doors to hold ordinary
people at bay. Going out of its way to protect the rights of the already
powerful, the Court rejects fusion candidates, ballot access for third
parties, or debates that are not limited to the two major parties and are
designed to address some of the sources of voter disaffection. 17 The
Court promotes democracy simply as the act of holding elections that
function as a test to narrow the electorate to those who are qualified,
i.e., those who successfully maneuver through the complex machinery,
the untrained poll workers, and the inconvenient polling hours to
actually cast a vote. Even if only a few people manage to or care to
vote, they are the ones qualified to act vicariously for everyone else.
The few can act and the many are simply urged to place their
confidence in traditions based on hierarchy and privilege, instead of
relationships that build trust, share power, and spark innovation.
15. After all, many accuse Ralph Nader of simply losing the election for Al Gore because the
92,000 votes cast for Nader in Florida would have changed the close election into a decisive Gore
victory. Sam Howe Verhovek, An UnrepentantNader Unveils a New Grass-Roots Project,N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A8, availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
16. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
17. See infra Part III.B (discussing proportional representation); see also Editorial, Third
Thoughts, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2002, at A18, available at 2002 WL 4151475 ("Inclusion is
vitally important now, when many people are so turned off by politics that they don't even bother
to vote.... Debate organizers who limit access marginalize third-party supporters and risk
spreading voter apathy.").
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In these ways the Court's interpretation of legal rules helps reduce
participation to an existential gesture, limiting the role of ordinary
people to the act of casting a ballot that may not count.1 8 Conveniently
enough, this interpretation preempts insurgent social movements from
influencing social policy by circumscribing opportunities for citizens to
act individually or organize collectively. It also constrains the chance
for democracy itself to evolve. And it assumes, rather than earns,
democratic legitimacy as it encourages blind faith in a "plutocracy"
of "natural leaders" rather than reasoned, contentious, and earnest
deliberation among the people themselves. Government by the people
becomes government by elites in the name of the people, which assures
that alienation thrives while activism is discouraged.
And yet, more accessible voting opportunities would only salvage a
small part of democracy's potential. Although the act of voting can be a
central means of asserting one's connection to the political system,
democracy is not simply about holding open elections where every
ballot counts. Rather, it is a "diffuse and urgent hope,"' 19 that the people
themselves can become moral and political actors in the civic fabric of
our society. Indeed, I would argue that we need democracy in our
everyday lives and not just on Election Day. We should consider
experimenting with even more participatory forms of self-government
that foster organizing and collective action at the local level. Unless
citizens in a democracy are able to participate over time in a public
process that permits them to speak for themselves, articulate their needs,
and share their vision, they cannot assume moral agency in public
policy debates and will never be equal partners in democratic decisionmaking.
In addition, as Ian Shapiro notes, "opposition rights are important for
democratic politics independently of the value of inclusive

18. Cf Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). According to
Justice Thomas, Section Two of the Voting Rights Act reaches only state enactments "that limit
citizens' access to the ballot" despite the language of the statute, which states that the term
"'voting' includes all action necessary to make a vote effective." Id. at 893, 919 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969)). He thus railed
against the dominant judicial approach ("a disastrous misadventure in judicial policymaking")
that viewed Section Two as a tool to overturn districting or other practices that unfairly dilute the
capacity of cohesive minority groups to elect candidates of their choice. Id. at 893 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
19.

CATHERINE ESCHLE, GLOBAL DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND FEMINISM 17

(2001) (quoting a 1992 statement by John Dunn); see also JAMES MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC
WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 5-6 (Yale Univ.

Press rev. ed. 1998) (1990).
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participation." 20 If we can acknowledge that democracy is a system for
structuring power relations, we can begin to reconceptualize our
own approach to valuing the interests and voices of the losers,
not just those of the winners. We can fortify the greatest resource of
any functioning democracy-the people themselves-by building
intermediate institutions that restore the link between the people and the
act of political decision-making. In other words, it is time to confront
system that perpetuates rather than
the paradox of a democratic
21
dismantles hierarchy.
Of course, building consensus for structural reforms that give
ordinary people a larger voice in the American political system is an
ambitious project. Democracy is not susceptible to a single definition,
and there is no reason to believe that those who presently enjoy
unfettered access to decision-making opportunity will simply agree to
share it with others, especially those they deem less qualified. As Dean
Michael Fitts observes, it is unlikely we can achieve "a normatively
precise theory of democracy" to instruct and resolve heated debates
"over the regulation of the electoral process. '2 2 Yet, as Professor Pildes
points out, after Bush v. Gore, questioning "the structures, institutions,
and ground rules of democracy.., can no longer be avoided. ' 23 When
the Supreme Court, with little guidance from prior precedents, acted to
stop the counting of ballots and handed one candidate the presidency of
the United States, the temporary stability such intervention yielded was
by no means permanent. By removing the choice from the voters
themselves, the Court's actions might portend even greater withdrawal
of those same voters from all aspects of democratic participation over
time.
In sum, the Court's involvement in George W. Bush's peculiar
ascension to the presidency highlights the "democracy-as-fortress"
mentality. Comfortable with the calcified architecture of our system,
many pundits, members of the governing elite, and both political parties
also advocate for what is familiar rather than what is fair. As a result,
the Court is not alone in its disregard for two foundational ideas of a
multiracial democracy: (1) that the people themselves are capable of

20. Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 235, 240 (Ira Katznelson & Helen Milner eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 2002) (1983).
21. While a hierarchy may be created in democratic ways, "hierarchies have propensities to
atrophy into systems of domination, necessitating institutional constraints that shift burdens of
proof to those who would defend them." Id. at 262.
22. Michael A. Fitts, The Hazards of Legal Fine Tuning: Confronting the Free Will Problem
in Election Law Scholarship, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1139 (1999).
23. Pildes, ConstitutionalizingDemocratic Politics,supra note 6, at 157.

2002]

Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux

governing; and (2) that such capacity requires interactive, engaging, and
egalitarian spaces in which the people can become informed, can
deliberate, and can eventually influence public decision-making.
Part I of this Essay explores in greater detail a few of the more salient
assumptions surrounding the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore.24 1
suggest that this decision, as flawed as it was, must be understood as
one of a series of Court judgments that privilege hierarchical rules over
more participatory forms of democratic decision-making. The Court's
decision must be understood in the context of a political system that has
neither shaken its roots in oligarchy nor offered an equitable voice to
people of color, poor people, and women-problems for which the
Supreme Court is only partially responsible. Part II explores how the
stories of both liberals and conservatives reward, and then justify, rule
by the most privileged Americans. 25 Part III then examines ways to
reconceptualize democratic citizenship to benefit us all. 26 I argue that
the experience of black voters in Florida showcased the need for such a
reconceptualization, and this movement must ultimately tie the
experiences of Americans of color to poor and working-class whites.
It is only by creating intermediate institutions, which can engage
multiracial groups of citizens throughout the political process, that we
will begin to see what a richly participatory and more egalitarian
democracy might look like. Finally, in Part IV, I respond to criticisms
that my analysis wrongly privileges procedural over substantive
justice. 2 7 The informal tone of this section tracks the ad hoc exchange I
had with Professor Seidman at the February 2002 Conference. There, I
argued against paternalistic approaches to justice where an "expert"
creates and implements solutions to major social problems. I continue
to believe that good social policies will likely emerge if the people
themselves are given the opportunity and the resources to help make the
decisions that will affect their lives.
I.

THE DECISION

Before turning to the hierarchical assumptions underlying the
Supreme Court's analysis in Bush v. Gore, it is worth briefly noting the
24. See infra Part I (analyzing the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore and its perpetration of
inequality in the voting process).
25. See infra Part II (discussing the influence of merit-based tests on the equality of voting
opportunities).
26. See infra Part III (proposing a new vision of democracy based on examples from other

nations).
27. See infra Part IV (discussing the benefits to social justice as a result of greater
participation by individuals in public policy debates).
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role of our nation's anti-democratic heritage in making it possible for a
candidate who lost the popular vote to accede to the presidency by
"winning" the Electoral College. As Yale law professor Akhil Amar
argues, the Electoral College was established as a device to boost the
power of Southern states in the election of the President.2 8 The same
"compromise" that gave Southern states more House members by
counting slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of apportioning
representation (while giving the slaves none of the privileges of
citizenship), gave those states Electoral College votes in proportion to
their congressional delegation. Treating non-voting slaves as a political
asset shifted power to the Southern states; not surprisingly, Southern
slaveholding presidents governed the nation for roughly fifty of the first
seventy-two years of our country's existence. As a result, the institution
of slavery, and the concept of black inferiority on which it depended,
defined the institutions of democracy itself. As Henry Wiencek writes,
"With their eyes open, the founders traded away the rights of AfricanAmericans, many of whom had fought bravely in the revolution, so that
the national enterprise could go forward.", 29 The fact that George W.
Bush lost the popular vote, yet gained the oval office through this very
same Electoral College, is a depressing reminder that the legacy of
racism distorts our governing structures to reinforce a tradition of
hierarchy.
However, this tradition is complex insofar as concepts that structure
and institutionalize inequality co-exist with values of democratic
opportunity. The fact that five justices of the United States Supreme
Court ultimately decided the closely contested presidential election of
2000, on the grounds of equal protection of the law, simply highlights
these contradictions between our rhetoric and our practice. The Court,
elsewhere unwilling to enforce a broad view of the rights of individuals
of color to equal protection, took an expansive view of the equal
protection claim in Bush v. Gore. Evoking the fulsome language of the
more liberal Warren Court opinions in the early one person, one vote

28. Akhil Amar, A ConstitutionalAccident Waiting to Happen, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 143,
144 (1995).
29. Henry Wiencek, Yale and the Price of Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2001, at A15,
available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
If the founders had such misgivings over slavery, how is it that they allowed slavery to
continue? The answer is not that they didn't know any better, but that they kept
slavery so the Southern states would join the union. It was a transaction, a deal, just
like the deal that put the national capital on the Potomac in exchange for the federal
assumption of states' debts ....
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cases of Reynolds v. Sims 30 and Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections,3 1 the current Court majority ruled, in the name of George W.
Bush's rights to equal protection of the laws, that the recounting of
Florida's closely divided votes could not continue. 32 In stark contrast to
much of its own recent precedent, the Supreme Court boldly entered the
political thicket to declare the right of a political candidate-and only
one political candidate at that-to have all the votes counted using a
single standard.3 3
The Court extended the equal protection of the right to vote to an
entirely new terrain-to the operation of the ballot counting machinery.
Instead of protecting equal and meaningful access to the ballot for all
voters, it focused on the "formulation of uniform rules" to determine
each voter's intent after the ballots were already cast. 34 Only at the
moment of tabulating votes ballot-by-ballot were specific,
uniform standards suddenly practicable; they were also, the Court
35
concluded, "necessary" to ensure "equal application" of the law.
This formulation ignored idiosyncratic local rules, which made it hard
for some voters to cast a ballot in the first place; 36 such disparate
procedures at the county level caused some who showed up to vote to
be effectively disenfranchised. This led to the enormous county-bycounty differences in the accessibility or accuracy of voting technology.
Yet the Court majority apparently was not moved to consider whether
such inequities in access to voting might disturb
the "confidence all
37
citizens must have in the outcome of elections."
According to many scholars, the Court's failure to examine the
widespread inequality in ballot access and technology, while invoking
30. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that two plans to apportion seats in the
Alabama Legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause).
31. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibited the creation of a poll tax by the State of Virginia).
32. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam).
33. The Court made sure to assert that its ruling applied only to the circumstances surrounding
the election of George W. Bush. Id. at 109 (per curiam) ("Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances ....
").
34. Id. at 106 (per curiam).
35. Id. (per curiam).
36. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (discussing disproportionate rejection of
ballots cast by African-Americans).
37. The brief submitted on behalf of Gore pointed out that Florida's sixty-seven counties used
four different vote tabulation mechanisms and that "[t]he use of different vote tabulating systems
undoubtedly will generate tabulation differences from county to county." Br. of Resp't Albert
Gore, Jr. at 42, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at 2000 WL 1809151.
Nevertheless, the Court only addressed the equal protection implications of the supposedly
different standards that officials used during the recount.
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the Equal Protection Clause at the moment of recounting ballots, created
nothing more than a false patina of legitimacy. 38 In reality, meaningful
democratic equality was not a concern. Rather, a set of anti-egalitarian
premises apparently provided the philosophical foundation for the
decision to enjoin the democratic process altogether and thus hand Mr.
Bush the presidency.3 9 Black voters, elderly Jewish voters in Palm
Beach County, and poor people throughout the state of Florida were
disenfranchised and left without a remedy. Principles of meritocracy
justified their disenfranchisement. 40 Essentially, they had to pass a test
to have their ballots counted, and the implicit suggestion was that only
those who passed this test actually deserve to participate in the
democratic process.
would
permit
the
our
constitutional
democracy
That
disenfranchisement of thousands-perhaps millions-of voters is a
function of the Court's ambivalence toward basic democratic principles,
and its longstanding preference for order over participation. In her
concurring opinion in a political gerrymandering case, Davis v.
Bandemer,4 1 Justice O'Connor suggested as much when she asserted
that a commitment to stability and measured change is the sine qua non
of a functioning democracy. 42 That is, "the emergence of a strong and
stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to
sound and effective government. The preservation and health of our
political institutions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on the
continued vitality of our two-party system, which permits both stability

38. For example, Heather Gerken argued that "[the] Court, in announcing a new type of equal
protection claim, is simply reverting to one of its worst habits in voting-rights cases: decisionmaking unmoored from an explicit normative theory." Heather Gerken, New Wine in Old
Bottles: A Comment on Richard Hasen's and Richard Briffault's Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407, 422 (2001) ("The Court's failure to wrestle with these questions-what
does equality mean, and how far should we go to attain it when the twin problems of race and
poverty permeate our democratic structures?-gives an unwarranted patina of legitimacy to the
election system."); see also Frank Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
679, 693 (2001) ("The justices of the Bush v Gore majority might be imagined as Machiavelli's
new prince, a ruler and savior prepared to sacrifice all to save the imperiled republic-probity,
reputation, even the salvation of an honored place in history.").
39. Indeed, in a timely and eerily propitious op-ed analyzing the class war in meritocratic
terms, David Lebedoff suggested in August 2000 that the removal of decision-making from the
people has become characteristic of the legal system itself. "Increasingly, too, major decisions
are made by judges and administrators virtually immune from electoral reproach, let alone
removal." David Lebedoff, The Class War Gore Could Lose, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2000, § 4, at
15, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
40. For a more in-depth discussion of this point, see infra Part III.
41. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion).
42. Id. at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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and measured change." 4 3 This preference for mechanical or traditionbound rules that privilege stability and measured change over genuine
and broad-based democratic participation also underlies the Court's
recent jurisprudence in its decisions to: (1) tolerate extreme political
gerrymandering that essentially predetermines electoral outcomes when
districts are drawn, thus, rendering elections virtually meaningless; 4 4 (2)
yet apply strict scrutiny to majority-minority districts designed to
provide people of color a fair opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice; 4 5 (3) rule that the First Amendment prohibits campaign
expenditure limits and certain other measures designed to limit the role
of private money in politics; 46 (4) privilege the associational rights of
the two major parties at the expense of broad-based participation in
primaries; 4 7 and (5) uphold various devices, such as strict ballot access
requirements, that inhibit the possibility
of third parties playing a
48
significant role in the political process.
43. Id. at 144-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. In Bandemer, the Court ruled that political gerrymandering was justiciable, but the Court's
threshold is so high that only once have plaintiffs successfully brought a partisan vote dilution
claim. Id. at 132 (plurality opinion); see also infra text accompanying notes 86-97 (discussing
the effects of political redistricting and the Court's application of heightened scrutiny).
45. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (challenging a redistricting plan by the Texas
legislature that created three districts in which racial minorities were the majority); Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1996) (rehearing the equal protection claim in Shaw v. Reno); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (alleging that the State of Georgia violated the Equal
Protection Clause by creating a new voting district); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993)
(holding that the State of North Carolina violated the Equal Protection Clause by enacting a
redistricting plan that resulted in "segregated" voting districts).
46. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 614-15 (1996)
(claiming that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Federal Campaign Act of
1971's limit on campaign expenditures); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (challenging
the constitutionality of the limit on campaign expenditures of the Federal Campaign Act of 1971).
47. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572 (2000) (alleging that the State of
California violated the First Amendment by implementing a "blanket" primary); Ark. Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1997) (arguing that the Arkansas
Educational Television Commission adhered to the First Amendment when refusing to allow a
congressional candidate to participate in a televised debate).
48. While the Court has struck down some of the most egregious laws attempting to deny fair
access to third parties, its concerns about destabilizing threats to the two-party system can also be
found in opinions on blanket primaries, fusion candidates, and party raiding. See, e.g., Cal.
Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 576-78; Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,
366-67 (1997) ("destabilizing effects of party-splintering and excessive factionalism" from
fusion tickets); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992) ("divisive sore-loser candidacies"
might emerge from allowing write-in voting in one-party Hawaii); Munro v. Socialist Workers
Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986). Justice Antonin Scalia offered a remarkable defense for the Court's
tolerance of laws that unfairly promote the existing two-party system and the alienation it brings
to large segments of the electorate: "The voter who feels himself disenfranchised should simply
join the party." Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 584; see also Theodore Lowi, Deregulating
the Duopoly: Two Party System Offers Narrow Choice, NATION, Dec. 4, 2000, at 7.
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Reflecting upon this pattern, Professors Heather Gerken and Spencer
Overton join Professor Pildes in his observation that Bush v. Gore was
part of the Court's longstanding failure to examine our democratic
principles to develop legal rules that foster an energetic and
inclusionary vision of democracy. 49 The elevation of stability and
measured change to a preferred status as the primary goal of politics
disconnects democracy from its participatory ideal. 50 The combination
of a thin and mechanistic view of democracy and a similarly thin and
mechanistic view of equality reinforces the ability of the elite within the
two major parties to compete among themselves for the reigns of power
while manipulating elections to assure the desired outcome. In effect, a
symbiotic relationship has developed between judicial commitments to
principles of stability and an electoral process that saps voter choice and
suppresses voter turnout.5 1 The Supreme Court's role in Bush v. Gore
must be assessed in the light of this phenomenon, which has deep roots
in our country's jurisprudential tradition.
Professor Pildes, for example, writes about a Supreme Court case
early in the twentieth century in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
ruled that the Court was helpless in the face of the elimination of black

Gerken, supra note 38, at 408.
One of the great oddities in the Supreme Court's voting-rights jurisprudence dating
back to the Warren Court is that the Justices often disavow the notion that they are
importing a particular theory of democracy into the decision. Their claim to
agnosticism is, of course, implausible. And the Court's self-conscious preference for
avoiding any discussion of its normative premises has led to the type of decision
making we see in the Bush v. Gore per curiam: an opinion that articulates the injury in
an abstract, formal manner; announces a legal rule with no easily discernible limits;
defines equality in mechanical, quantitative terms; and fails to address the hard
normative issues embedded in the questions it resolves.
Id.; see also Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2001).
50. Richard Pildes, Democracy and Disorder,68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 707 (2001) (citing
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366). Pildes concludes that "[t]he central image in this opinion is not that
of invigorated democracy through 'political competition,' but that of a system whose crucial
'political stability' is easily threatened. The word 'stable' (and variations of it) appears a
remarkable ten times in the brief majority opinion." Id. at 708.
51. For example, as I discuss shortly, radical gerrymandering shifts electoral choices to
incumbent politicians and makes elections "sclerotic and immune to change." David Garrow,
Ruining the House, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at 29A, available at LEXIS, News Library, The
New York Times File (arguing that election officials and politicians use districting to make
elections less competitive, which drives voters from the polls); see also infra notes 85-90 and
accompanying text (explaining how incumbent politicians design districts and the effect of that
design on the voters in the districts). Meanwhile the Court, for the most part, looks the other way.
See infra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining how few gerrymandering claims succeed).
49.
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citizens from political participation in Alabama. 52 Jackson Giles, "a
literate black man and Republican-party activist," who had a federal
patronage job as janitor in the federal courthouse in Montgomery,
Alabama, "had registered and voted in Montgomery from 1871
to 1901." 53 Giles, represented by a lawyer hired by Booker T.
Washington, challenged the handiwork of the 1901 Alabama
Constitutional Convention that disenfranchised him (and countless
others) with, in the words of the convention's president, the explicit
purpose "'to establish white supremacy in this State."' 54 In a classic
"catch-22," "Holmes concluded that the very wrong Giles complained
of made impossible the relief he sought." 55 If the statute were a
fraudulent scheme, as Giles suggested, and were the Court to order
Giles's name added to the voter registration list, the Court would itself
be party to the very fraud at issue. 56 The Court also refused, on the
grounds of its institutional incompetence, to intervene. 57 It lacked the
enforcement authority to protect Giles's rights "when the great mass of
the whitefs]" in Alabama were opposed to his voting.58
It is striking how similar the effects of the Supreme Court's decision
in Bush v. Gore are with those of Giles v. Harris, even as Holmes's

opinion in Giles, in Pildes' words, "has been airbrushed out of the
constitutional canon." 59 While its reasoning was couched in the
language of equal protection, the Court's ruling in Bush v. Gore also
52. Richard Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295,
306 (2000) [hereinafter Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon]. The case Pildes

discusses is Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903).
53.

Pildes, Democracy,Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, supra note 52, at 299.

54. Id. at 302 (quoting Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985)).
55. Id. at 306 (citing Giles, 189 U.S. at 486-87).
56. Id. (citing Giles, 189 U.S. at 486).
57. Id. at 307 (citing Giles, 189 U.S. at 488).
58. Id. at 306 (citing Giles, 189 U.S. at 488). In fact, there is some evidence that a majority of
whites actually voted against the disfranchising constitution, and that it only passed because the
votes of blacks, who never appeared at the polls, were nevertheless counted as supporting their
own disfranchisement. ("The disfranchising constitution was approved with only 57% of the vote
(a margin of 26,879 votes)" and in fifty-four of the state's sixty-six counties, the total vote was
actually against the constitution. Approval only came with the 36,224 to 5471 vote for the
constitution in twelve Black-Belt counties where three times as many votes were cast for the
constitution as the number of white men eligible to vote.) Id. at 315-16. The elite landowners,
who used their control of the Democratic Party to discourage alliances between poor whites and
blacks, engineered the voting. Id.
59.

Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, supra note 52, at 297. For example,

Justice Frankfurter cites Giles v. Harris in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552, 573 (1946),
where he coined the now infamous terminology "political thicket" and cautioned that the Court
must stay out of it, id. at 556. Yet the same case, Giles v. Harris,does not receive any mention in
four of the leading Constitutional Law casebooks. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the
Canon, supra note 52, at 297.
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upheld the rights of a majority of white people to choose the President
of the United States; meanwhile, many blacks (and others) were
disenfranchised in Florida, as were all blacks and many poor whites
almost 100 years earlier in Alabama. 6 1 Holmes's putative commitment
to majority rule was hardly democratic since it failed to consider the
protection and inclusion of the minority; this same lesson is clearly still
relevant in the context of the Court's failure in Bush v. Gore to value the
discarded votes of Americans of color. Similarly, Holmes's contorted,
or in Pildes' term "repellant," logic and the Bush v. Gore per curiam's
opinion both value disingenuous uniformity and the appearance of
stability over genuine equality in democratic participation. 62 In these
ways, the five member majority in Bush v. Gore continues the benighted
trajectory of opinions in which the Supreme Court simultaneously
"remov[es] [genuine] democracy from the agenda of constitutional
law," 6 3 while it intervenes to uproot democratic innovations that
threaten the status quo.
As the political scientist Alex Keyssar points out:
[T]he very unpretty election of last November emerged from deep
currents in American political life. Although we don't like to
acknowledge it, there have always been strong anti-democratic forces
in the United States. Large numbers of Americans, throughout our
history, have64 not believed in universal suffrage and have acted
accordingly.
Keyssar emphasizes elsewhere, in his treatise on the right to vote, a
factor crucial to understanding our democratic ambivalence: those
65
opposed to universal suffrage were members of the founding elite.
Their influence disenfranchised vast numbers of our population from
the very beginning of our constitutional democracy; their assumptions

60. Bush was able to poll a majority of the votes cast by whites, including many working-class
whites, to make the contest in Florida close. This was also true nationwide. Even the so-called
gender gap is only apparent when the votes of black women are also included. When only white
women's voting patterns are observed, a small plurality preferred Bush. See Marjorie Connelly,
The Election; Who Voted: A Portraitof American Politics, 1976-2000, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2000, § 4, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File. Gore did,
however, score impressive wins among voters from union households. Id.
61. Of course, it is important to note that unlike Mr. Giles's attorney, Mr. Gore's lawyers did
not raise the disenfranchisement issue on the grounds of race. Indeed, the disenfranchisement
was subtler and not universal. Nevertheless, the burdens fell heavily on those voters most easily
confused, discouraged, and traditionally disadvantaged.
62. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, supra note 52, at 298.
63. Id. at 296.
64. Alex Keyssar, Reform and an Evolving Electorate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, § 4, at 13,
availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
65. Id.; see also KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at xxi-xxii, 67-70, 78-80.
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that the elite should rule helped contract not only the right to vote but
also the right to cast an effective vote. The Americans who harbored
such ambivalence continued beyond the early years of our country's
history to include, at different stages, the leadership of both the
Both political parties have
Democratic and Republican Parties.
cooperated, some might even say conspired, to constrict the electorate
in order to insure their own dominance.
This highly anti-democratic impulse has had devastating
consequences for disadvantaged individuals of all races. Few among us
are familiar with the way the leaders of the Democratic Party, for
example, orchestrated the disenfranchisement of blacks as well as
masses of poor whites throughout the South during the late 1800s
and early 1900s. 6 6 According to Professor Pildes, "the framers of
disfranchisement were typically the most conservative, large
landowning, wealthy faction of the Democratic Party, who were also
seeking to entrench their partisan power and fend off challenges from
Republicans, Populists, other third parties, as well as the more populist
wings of the Democratic Party." 67 Their goal was to remove the less
educated and impoverished whites who might be inclined to join forces
with the even more impoverished blacks to challenge the Democrats'
one-party rule. 6 8 The Democratic Party was "the organized vehicle of
white supremacy" and it "regained control of the legislature and
governor's office by framing politics around issues of race rather than
economics or class."69 The Democratic Party aimed to thwart the
conditions that made for genuine multi-party competition and greater
participation by poor and uneducated whites as well as blacks. And
these tactics were extraordinarily successful. By the early 1900s, a
combination of poll taxes, literacy tests, and other devices that
discouraged the uneducated from voting had stripped roughly threeSouthern male population-black and white--of the
quarters of the
70
right to vote.
The unseemly role of the Democratic Party in the South at the
beginning of the twentieth century foreshadowed more contemporary
complaints that some in the Republican Party orchestrated, or at least
66. FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 78-80
(1988).
67. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, supra note 52, at 302.
68. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS 238-65 (1974).
69. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, supra note 52, at 313-14 (describing
events in North Carolina, where "a fusion coalition of Republicans and Populists ... controlled
the state legislature" through 1898, with black and white support).
70. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 66, at 80-84.
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benefited from, the massive disenfranchisement of Florida's voters in
Election 2000. Moreover, in part due to the aforementioned bias in
voting technology, even when poor people do go to the ballot box, their
votes are three times more likely to go uncounted than the votes of their
affluent white counterparts. 71 And, if this differential participation rate
were not enough, the exceptional importance of private money in
American politics, by international standards, provides the country's
elites with an additional lever to influence policymaking. Efforts to
disenfranchise voters, in other words, are not limited to idiosyncrasies
of either the current conservative Supreme Court majority or one
political ideology. Nor have these exclusionary tactics always been
based on race or even class.
After New Jersey passed a law barring even property-holding women
from voting in 1807, "women everywhere in the nation were
Elites employed the ideology of virtual
barred from the polls."
representation-suggesting that women were represented by their
husbands, brothers and fathers 73-to deny women the franchise in most
of the country until the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in
1920. During this period, the Supreme Court, influenced by the
founders, refused to intervene in yet another voting case. In 1874, the
Court unanimously rejected a claim by Virginia Minor that Missouri's
gender-based disenfranchisement violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 74 The Court ruled that
suffrage was not coextensive with citizenship; and thus that states
possessed the authority to decide which citizens could and could not
vote. Bringing an end to debates that had surfaced periodically for
decades, the Court formally ratified the severance of national
citizenship from suffrage that the late-eighteenth-century authors of
had devised as a solution to their own political
the Constitution
75
problems.

What is significant, therefore, is not simply the disconcerting parallel
between the disenfranchisement of blacks at the turn of the

71. David Stout, Study Finds Ballot Problems Are More Likely for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2001, at A9, LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File. Another study revealed that, in
total, poor voting technology contributed to four to six million votes being uncounted for the
presidential election, and that the incidence of uncounted ballots rose to even higher levels for
other contests. See Guy Gugliotta, Study Finds Millions of Votes Lost; Universities Urge Better
Technology, Ballot Procedures, WASH. POST, July 17, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL
23181142.
72. KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 54.
73. Id. at 174.
74. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874).
75. KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 181 (citing Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 163).
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twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For blacks, women, and poor
whites, Supreme Court decisions that avoid engaging basic democratic
principles affect our larger understanding of democracy itself. The real
significance of the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election is the way
that the disenfranchisement of blacks in Florida highlights the country's
history of tolerating disenfranchisement across the board.7 6
The effective disenfranchisement of a major portion of our citizenry
continues over 200 years after the founding of the Republic. Over four
million Americans, 2.1% of the country's voting age population, are
literally disenfranchised because of state laws limiting ballot access to
felons and ex-felons. 77 The great majority of those barred from voting
are not incarcerated; they are either ex-felons or on parole or
probation. 78 Many states with the harshest voting restrictions trace their
laws directly to the Jim Crow period, when Southern elites first
sought to use them as part of a comprehensive strategy of black
disenfranchisement. 79 Moreover, given the disproportionate numbers of
blacks and Latinos who are prosecuted and then imprisoned (frequently
for the commission of crimes comparable to those committed by whites
who nevertheless escape prison time), these laws continue to have a
devastating impact on African-Americans. 8° Over 6% of black adults
76. Efforts to ameliorate the absurd levels of voter disenfranchisement are haphazard and
often ineffective despite the media scrutiny evoked by the 2000 election. The state spent over
$30 million in new voting technology; yet, because it failed to train poll workers or test the new
machines in advance, Florida's 2002 Democratic Primary Election was characterized by the
effective disenfranchisement of numerous voters in South Florida: "Electronic ballot devices with
glitches replaced hanging chads. Problems with perforated ballot cards replaced problems with
butterfly ballots. But the result was all the same: disenfranchised voters, hand-counted ballots
and delayed results." Dana Canedy, Again, Sunshine State in Dark a Day After the Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2002, at A18, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
Faulty equipment forced polling officials to turn away hundreds of voters in Liberty City, a
predominately black neighborhood in Miami. Dana Canedy, Vote System Chaos Triumphs Again
in FloridaElection, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at A28, available at LEXIS, News Library, The
New York Times File.
77. ELIZABETH SIMSON, JUSTICE DENIED: HOW FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at v (Americans for Democratic Action Educ. Fund 2002),
available at http://www.adaction.org/lizfullpaper.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
78. Id. at 24-25.
79. Id. at 16.
80. Prosecution for drug offenses is an area where this racial bias in the criminal justice
system is particularly dramatic. Blacks represent 15% of drug users; yet, they constitute 33% of
drug arrests, 55% of drug convictions, and 74% of those sentenced to prison for nonviolent drug
offenses. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 264 (2002). Other studies have documented
racial bias in other areas, notably including pre-textual traffic stops and pre-trial negotiations. See
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE chs. 7-8 (1999). Moreover, the type of activities
legislatures choose to make felonies has a significantly adverse impact on Americans of color.
Drunk driving is responsible for as many deaths as deaths related to the drug trade. Id. at 134-35.
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nationwide are legally forbidden to vote. 8 1 In both Florida and
Alabama, which along with eleven other states permanently
disenfranchise felons, 82 31% of black men are denied the right to cast a
ballot. 83 Note
also that this practice is unique among the world's
84
democracies.
Other political procedures that effectively disenfranchise even greater
numbers of Americans are more subtle but no less effective. Through
the extreme political gerrymandering that now characterizes every new
round of redistricting, the two-party duopoly divides voters in such a
way as to ensure that elections are essentially decided before a single
vote is cast. Incumbent politicians design districts looking for voters,
and they capture voters who are likely to vote for them. 85 For example,
Matthew Dowd, President Bush's pollster, accurately predicted that the
latest round of redistricting would give each party almost 200 safe
congressional seats out of a total of 435. Experts for both parties
estimated that only twenty-five to fifty congressional races would be
genuinely competitive in 2002. 86 In the 1990s, the juggernaut of radical
gerrymandering meant that almost 75% of United States House seats
did not change hands once, and the parties appeared to have eliminated
even more competitive seats in their quest to maximize incumbent

Nevertheless, drunk drivers are "generally charged as misdemeanants and receive sentences of
fines, license suspension and community service." Id. at 135. Seventy-eight percent of those
arrested for drunk driving are white males. Id.
81. SIMSON, supra note 77, at v.
82. See id. at 25-26 (listing states that permanently disenfranchise felons).
83. Id. at 29.
84. Id. at 38.
85. In most states, state legislatures conduct the decennial redistricting for both state
legislative and congressional districts. A significant minority of states has created redistricting
commissions, whose compositions and precise role in the redistricting process vary significantly
by state. Only a handful of states have completely removed the role of the legislature. Moreover,
while redistricting commissions may in some cases have better partisan balance than the state
legislature, representatives of the two-party duopoly generally dominate their memberships. See
Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REv. 837, 841-45
(1997). While Kubin concludes that redistricting commissions "offer a viable means of restoring
a degree of efficiency, fairness, and finality to a state's decennial gerrymander," he acknowledges
that they are "no panacea." Id. at 838. Moreover, note that whatever the merits of independent
redistricting commissions, they in no way guarantee equitable representation for people of color.
See Adela de la Torre, Arizona Redistricting: Issues Surrounding Hispanic Voter Representation,
6 TEX. HIsP. J.L. & POL'Y 163 (2001); Symposium, Drawing Lines in the Sand: The Texas
Latino Community and Redistricting2001, 6 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 77-79 (2001) (statement
of Will Harell).
86. Ronald Brownstein, Close House Races Go the Way of Rotary Phones, Newt Gingrich,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at A13, availableat 2002 WL 2468600.
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protection in the 2000 round of redistricting. 87 The voters who are
consistently on the losing side in these safe seats are only represented
virtually-they are represented by a candidate they didn't vote for, but
who many of their neighbors did, just as women in the nineteenth
century were supposedly represented by officials they did not vote for
but who their male relatives and neighbors chose.
As bad as this situation is with regard to congressional elections, it is
even worse at the state level. In over 40% of state legislative elections
in 2000, only one of the two major parties placed a candidate on the
ballot. 8 8 Think about that for a second: four out of ten times that
Americans go to vote for their representative in the legislative body of
our powerful state governments, they essentially have no more choices
on the ballot than did voters in the Soviet Union or other countries
across the world where authoritarian regimes continue to hold singleparty "elections. " 89 Once again, the Supreme Court's preference for
political stability, even at the expense of genuine democratic
participation, is clear in its approach to districting.
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Court ruled that political gerrymandering
could give rise to a justiciable equal protection claim. 90 However, as
this doctrine has evolved, courts have set an extremely high bar for
plaintiffs to succeed in meeting the Bandemer plurality's conclusion
that "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral
system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's
91
or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."
Essentially, one of the two major parties must demonstrate that the
districting process has virtually eliminated its capacity to elect officials
statewide. 9 2 This burden has proved almost impossible; in the sixteen
87. Id.; see also Garrow, supra note 51 (arguing that election officials and politicians use
districting to make elections less competitive); infra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing
manipulation of voting districts by incumbents of both major parties).
88. DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES 86 (2d ed. 2002) (1993) [hereinafter
AMY, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES].
89. Some authoritarian regimes continue to control political power by allowing only members
of the ruling party-or approved non-partisan candidates-to contest elections. For instance, in
February of this year, Laos conducted elections for its 109-member National Assembly. The
ruling communist party won 108 seats, and one approved non-partisan candidate was also elected.
Elections Around the World, Elections in Laos, at www.electionworld.org/election/laos.htm (last
visited Sept. 29, 2002).
90. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113, 143 (1986) (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 132 (plurality opinion).
92. Cf Badham v. March Fong Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that the
Republican Party had not stated a cause of action under Bandemer despite an electoral map that
consistently left Republicans underrepresented in congressional seats compared with their
proportion of the statewide vote because "[t]here are no allegations that California Republicans
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years since Bandemer, only once has a political gerrymandering claim
succeeded.93
In marked contrast to its unwillingness to enter the "political thicket"
in these gerrymandering cases, the Court has taken a remarkably
interventionist stance in striking down districts designed to allow people
of color to elect candidates of their choice. Despite what the advocates
of colorblindness would like us to believe, voting remains highly
correlated with race in our country. 94 Blacks and whites generally
prefer different candidates and platforms. To ensure that blacks and
other people of color have a chance to elect candidates in our winnertake-all district elections, the Voting Rights Act and its amendments
encouraged the creation of majority-minority districts under certain
circumstances. 95 In the 1990s, the Supreme Court ruled in case after
case that districts drawn primarily on the basis of race are subject to
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 9 6 In one case
involving a single congressional district in North Carolina, the case
went up and down
to the Supreme Court four times within one
97
districting cycle.
In short, the Supreme Court's approach to districting-like its
decision in Bush v. Gore, its use of the First Amendment to strike down
campaign finance laws, and its toleration of various devices designed to
create barriers to new parties seeking to disrupt the current duopolyhave been 'shut out' of the political process"), affd, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989). Bernard Grofman
had called the plan at issue in the case "the most egregious gerrymander of the decade." Bernard
Grofman, An Expert Witness Perspective on Continuing and Emerging Voting Rights
Controversies:From One Person, One Vote to PartisanGerrymandering, 21 STETSON L. REV.
783, 816 (1992).
93. See Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that the
plaintiff Republican Party had stated a cause of action in alleging that North Carolina's use of
state-wide elections for superior court judges-an "essentially" local office-had resulted in only
one Republican being elected superior court judge in approximately 220 elections between 1968
and 1992). After a trial, the district court ordered elections to be conducted on a district-basis
rather than statewide. The Court of Appeals, however, later vacated this injunction in light of
1994 elections in which all eight Republicans seeking statewide election to superior court won.
Republican Party of N.C. v. Hunt, 77 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (unpublished table
decision), availableat 1996 WL 60439, at **4.
94. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual
Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383, 1400-01 (2001) (finding that
"a clear pattern of racial bloc voting exists" in congressional elections in the South in the 1990s).
95. See Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974(e) (2000).
96. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
97. The district I am referring to was North Carolina's 12th Congressional District. See
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw I1]; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) [hereinafter
Shaw 1].
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represents the imposition of the majority justices' incongruous vision of
democracy. On the one hand, they are committed to "stability and
measured change." This position leads them to decline to exercise
judicial power, in cases like Giles v. Harris9 8 or even Davis v.
Bandemer,9 9 where the Court deferred to the preferences of the
majority, even when the majority, as in Bandemer, is artificially
manufactured. On the other hand, they aggressively supervise the
conduct of elections-overruling the decisions of state legislative
bodies-when the majority implements measures to reform electoral
politics in ways that conflict with the aesthetic vision of certain justices.
This inconsistent approach means elites continue to rule and efforts,
even those supported by local majorities, to include or foster the
participation of more people of color, poor people, and women are
frequently interrupted.
Consider for a moment why changes are needed to facilitate the
equitable representation of these groups. Despite having one of the
world's most active women's movements, women comprise only 13.8%
(a record high) of the 107th United States Congress.' 0 0 In Western
01
Europe, women make up 23.9% of the average national parliament.'
Worldwide, the United States ranks forty-fifth in its representation of
women in national legislatures or parliaments. 10 2 Considering its
long history as a multiracial, polyethnic society, the United States
also continues to be exceptionally poor at including people of color
in politics. African-Americans, the country's largest racial minority,
comprise slightly over 12% of the population but only 6.7% of the
107th Congress. 10 3 In New Zealand, people of Maori descent-whose
situation "[i]n terms of demographics and socioeconomic status... is
remarkably similar to that of African-Americans in the United

98. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); see also supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text
(discussing the decision in Giles).
99. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 41-43,
90-91 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Bandemer).
100. MILDRED L. AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMBERSHIP OF THE 107TH CONGRESS:
A PROFILE CRS-i, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/politics/congress/profl07.pdf
(last modified Jan. 10, 2001).
101. Calculations from table in MICHAEL GALLAGHER ET AL., REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT IN MODERN EUROPE: INSTITUTIONS, PARTIES, AND GOVERNMENTS 322 (3d ed.
2001).
102. Beverly Neufeld, Editorial, Finally,Big Women on Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001,
at A28, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
103. See AMER, supra note 100, at CRS-5.
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States"l°04-represent 14.5% of the population and hold 13.3% of the
seats in parliament. 10 5 In South Africa, the white minority represents
10 6
15% of the population and a full 32% of the national legislature.
In the 2000 election, most women and people of color voted for the
losing candidate as did a majority of all those who case ballots in the
presidential race. Despite our rhetorical commitments to majority rule,
a candidate favored by a relatively privileged minority became
President. Certainly, the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore
serves as a continuing reminder that some of the nation's most powerful
institutions are governed by disturbingly elitist principles. However,
Bush v. Gore is really just the tip of the iceberg in this nation where, in
stark contrast to our liberal, democratic, collective self-image, the
voices of those less privileged are systematically discounted and half of
the population does not vote at all.
The Supreme Court's role, albeit key, is not alone responsible for our
nation's reliance on an impoverished conception of democracy
that camouflages widening inequality. After all, both liberals and
conservatives manage to justify the idea of rule by an elite. Their elite
is sometimes differently defined: it is a meritocracy for most liberals; a
plutocracy for many conservatives. Yet, the end result is similar. In a
country where deep, structural inequalities prevent everyone from
succeeding on tests of "knowledgeable voting," the importation of
meritocracy into the electoral arena fundamentally undermines the
values of democratic participation. 107 As a result, those who are already
privileged retain their power, and egalitarian terminology increasingly
substitutes for meaningful representation or popular involvement in
our democratic experiment. It is to these meritocratic justifications
underlying the disturbing elitism at the heart of our democracy that I
now turn.

104. SUSAN A. BANDUCCI ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION, EMPOWERMENT, AND
PARTICIPATION IN NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES 6 (rev. ed. 1999), available at
http://www.nzes.org/papers/wpsa99_revised.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
105. Visitor Services, Parliament, Maori Members of Parliament from 1868, at
(last visited Nov. 20,
http://www.ps.parliament.govt.nz/educate/indexes/texts/maorimp.htm
2002).
106.

ANDREW REYNOLDS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL

DESIGN 70 (2d ed. 1997), at http://www.idea.int/esd/publications.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2002)
[hereinafter IDEA HANDBOOK].
107. In the aftermath of the Florida debacle, there was widespread contempt in some quarters
for those low-income or elderly voters who "lost their votes ... because of rotten ballot design.
The elitists said if these voters were too dumb or uneducated to use the equipment right, they
deserved to lose their ballots. E.J. Dionne, D.C. Gives a Lesson in Voting, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
2002, at A21, availableat 2002 WL 100082603.
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II. RULE BY PRIVILEGE

On the presumption that they could discern a merit-based approach to
voting, the conservative majority stopped the recounting of votes in
Florida. During oral argument in Bush v. Gore, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor grilled Al Gore's lawyer, David Boies, about what votecounting standard could properly be used in terms of determining the
intent of the voter: "Well, why isn't the standard the one that voters are
instructed to follow, for goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn't be clearer.
I mean, why don't we go to that standard?" 10 8 As a result of the Court's
decision to stop the recount, those voters who were unable to follow
"the rules" simply failed to file a legal vote when they cast their ballot.
Their citizenship rights were only as strong as their county's voting
machine's ability to discern their intent.
This "merit-based" approach to democracy-just like the "meritbased" approach to admissions in other institutions-systematically
privileges wealthy, white Americans over poor people and people of
color. The Court found in 1970, for example, that the use of tests or
devices to "discern merit" can perpetuate racialized inequities in
educational opportunity; they can and did also depress voter registration
and participation by poor whites. Indeed, the Voting Rights Act of
1965 explicitly prohibited the use of literacy tests as a precondition to
nationwide in 1970 and unanimously upheld by
voting, a ban extended
10 9
Court.
Supreme
the
The current Court seems in thrall of the illusion that merit is easily
testable and an acceptable basis on which to distribute democratic
opportunity. This perception is consistent with the story the term
meritocracy was designed to tell. The term was coined in 1958 by a

108. Tr. of Oral Argument, Dec. 11, 2000, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949),
available at 2000 WL 1804429, at *58. Justice O'Connor's query echoes the position of Joseph
Klock (the lawyer arguing on behalf of Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris). Responding
to Justice Souter's question about what a uniform standard would be for counting ballots, Klock
said:
I'll try to answer that question. You would start, I would believe, with the
requirements that the voter has when they go into the booth. That would be a standard
to start with. The voter is told in the polling place and then when they walk into the
booth that what you are supposed to do with respect to the punch cards, is put the ballot
in, punch your selections, take the ballot out, and make sure there are no hanging
pieces of paper attached to it. The whole issue of what constitutes a legal vote, which
the Democrats make much ado about, presumes that it's a legal vote no matter what
you do with the card. And presumably, you could take the card out of the polling place
and not stick it in the box and they would consider that to be a legal vote.
Id. at *28-29.
109. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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British sociologist, writing a parody of privilege and power."l 0 A
meritocracy was a device by which those who already had power
defined a system that enabled them to retain their status, encouraging
the winners to believe they earned their victory and the losers to believe
that they too deserved their lot in life.1 11 Admissions to elite colleges
are a perfect example: although the original application of the
meritocracy concept to the college admissions process was done in the
name of extending access to students beyond the confines of the New
England private preparatory schools, it, too, has become a vehicle for
codifying and camouflaging social hierarchy. 112 Our preoccupation
with meritocracy has become a preoccupation with the sorting-andranking behavior that awards scarce places in higher education on the
basis of timed tests that favor those possessing the resources to prepare
for the test.1 13 The resulting test scores become the building blocks of a
testocracy, and are then deemed the most important evidence of an
' 114
individual's visible, rankable worth or "merit."
Still, within each race and ethnic group, aptitude test scores rise
substantially with parental income. 1 15 When public institutions use
"merit-based" tests to allocate democratic opportunity, those already
privileged benefit the most. At the University of California at Berkeley,
for example, in 1997, 42% of the white freshman came from families
who earned more than $100,000 a year, even though this is a public
institution financed by all taxpayers. 116 At the University of Texas,
when a standardized test-centered approach determined admission, 75%
of the freshman class came from 10% of the state's 1500 high schools.
The middle- and upper middle-class suburban high schools dominated

110.

MICHAEL YOUNG, THE RISEOF THE MERITOCRACY 1870-2033 (1958).

111.
112.

Id.
NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST 343-50 (1999).

113. Indeed, these standardized test scores tend to correlate better with parental income (and
even grandparents' socioeconomic status) than actual student performance in college or graduate
school. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 987-92 (1996).
114. The term "testocracy" highlights the ways in which selection policies are heavily
dependent on standardized aptitude testing. See id. at 968. "Testocracy" "refer[s] to test-centered
efforts to score applicants, rank them comparatively, and then predict their future performance."
Id. However, in this Essay, I limit the discussion of testing to aptitude tests (as opposed to
achievement tests).
115. Id. at989.
116. See Mindy Kornhaber, Reconfiguring Admissions to Serve the Mission of Selective
Public Higher Education (January 14, 1999) (unpublished typescript, on file with author). In
1997, nearly 42% of white freshman at Berkeley had parental incomes over $100,000 a year, as
did 27% of Asians. Id. In contrast, 14% of African-Americans and 10% of Chicanos had family
incomes at that level. Id.
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the admissions process at Texas' public universities and some poor,
predominantly white rural counties did not send a single resident to
either of the state's two flagship schools. The use of standardized tests,
in other words, disadvantages poor whites as well as blacks and Latinos.
When the admissions process strongly favors white, upper middle-class
students, very few of whom pursue careers devoted to the public
interest, it is not surprising that the new meritocracy breeds resentment
among those who are excluded. 1 7 What is surprising, however, is that
despite significant evidence that aptitude tests fail to predict anything
beyond first-year college grades (and even then the relationship is
extremely modest), an array of explanations justifies the exclusion of
those who do not do as well on what have become 'class-based' criteria
for determining merit. In fact, studies show that the aptitude tests more
accurately measure parental socioeconomic status than first-year college
grades. 118
This phenomenon of normalizing inequitable outcomes applies in
politics as well. Tracking conventional forms of "meritocratic"
selection, the baseline for "admission" is a single uniform standard.
The only difference is whether the applicant's performance, as
measured by that standard, entitles her to admission to college or deems
her capable of casting a legal vote. Such a standard purports to be
objective and fair in identifying who deserves admission. Just as
entrance to highly selective colleges is supposedly based on visible,
rankable merit, participation in a democracy becomes synonymous with
measurable ability-arbitrarily evaluated at the micro level of ballot
counting not ballot voting-to cast a "legal vote."
But as the 2000 election made painfully clear, such purportedly
merit-based tests contain a bias toward existing privilege, which has a

117. As it has evolved, the notion of contributing to the community has also taken a back seat
in the equation. Many of those admitted based on their test scores come to believe that their merit
justifies their continued privilege. Thus, they are not burdened even by notions of noblesse
oblige in terms of public service, self-sacrifice for the common good, or acts of public charity.
Indeed, 59.8% of college students cite the "likelihood of making money" as a very effective
motivating factor, whereas only 38.6% are motivated by opportunities to "give back to the
community." INST. OF POLITICS, HARVARD UNIV., ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS AND PUBLIC
SERVICE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF COLLEGE UNDERGRADUATES: TOP LINE DATA 4 (2000),
available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/iop/survey-data.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2002).
118. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 113, at 971-72. The correlation between aptitude test
scores and parental income should not surprise us, given the role that high-priced coaching
techniques play in raising test scores. Id. at 991. But what may surprise some is just how weak
the relationship is between high test scores and what the tests claim to predict (i.e., first year
college or law school grades). Id. Studies suggest that nationwide the aptitude test for law
schools (LSAT) is between 9% and 14% better than random in predicting first year grades. Id. at
971.
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major impact at the earliest stage of the voting process-at the ballot
box. Rules that limit time in the voting booth to five minutes even
when ballots are long and complex, fail to provide adequate help to
illiterate voters, and deny voters a chance to cast a ballot for their first
choice candidate, without jeopardizing their second choice candidate's
election, all combine to privilege participation by the better-educated
members of the electorate. Presumably fair and objective, these voting
rules define the "legitimate" or deserving voters, restricting ballot
access to those who are educated, and for that matter, who can afford to
take time off from work to vote. Yet, this inequality in access to the
ballot is apparently constitutionally irrelevant, while inequality during a
recount is dispositive evidence of a constitutional violation. Even
worse, in Florida and many other states, disparate ballot technology
makes the voting process the most complicated for the poorest and least
well-educated members of society, especially those who are also
descendants of slaves or treated as such.
The racial effects of applying a so-called merit-based approach to
voting in Florida were striking: automatic machines rejected 14.4% of
ballots cast by African-Americans, but only 1.6% of ballots cast by
others. 1 19 Although blacks made up 16% of the voting population, they
cast 54% of the machine-rejected ballots. 12 Ballots cast by AfricanAmericans were almost ten times more likely than the ballots of whites
to be rejected. 12 1 Furthermore, counting machines rejected punch card
ballots in predominantly African-American precincts in Miami-Dade
County at twice the rate they rejected ballots in predominantly
Latino precincts, and four times the rate they rejected ballots in
predominantly white precincts. 122 Black precincts also lacked the
119. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Divided Civil Rights Panel Approves Election Report, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2001, at A8, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File

(reporting on a study conducted by Allan J. Lichtman, a history professor at American University
and an elections expert); see also U.S. to Look into Possible Irregularities at the Polls, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 4, 2000, § 1, at 9, available at 2000 WL 29782894 [hereinafter Possible
Irregularitiesat the Polls] ("The Washington Post reported Sunday that a computer analysis had
found that the more black and Democratic a precinct, the more likely a high number of
presidential votes was not counted.").
120. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2 (2001).
121. See id.
122. See Josh Barbanel & Ford Fessenden, Racial Pattern in Demographics of Error-Prone
Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at A25, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York
Times File. The potential magnitude of the difference in technology "is evident in Miami-Dade
County, where predominantly black precincts saw their votes thrown out at twice the rate as
Hispanic precincts and nearly four times the rate of white precincts. In all, 1 out of 11 ballots in
predominantly black precincts were rejected, a total of 9,904." Id. Moreover, "64 percent of the
state's black voters live in counties that used the punch cards while 56 percent of whites did so."
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technology that helped handle overflow crowds in white and some

Latino (Cuban/Republican) precincts. Compounding the problem were
flaws in the registration lists and state law prohibiting from voting those
23
who have served their time in prison and repaid their debt to society. 1
Researchers estimate that if Florida did not disenfranchise over 200,000
felons and over 500,000 ex-felons,
Gore would have carried the state by
124

some 80,000 to 90,000 votes.

Indeed, this merit-based approach to ballot counting (that ignores
blatant inequities in access to the act of voting itself) is hauntingly
reminiscent of devices, like literacy tests and grandfather clauses,
imposed systematically throughout the South following Reconstruction
to disenfranchise black voters. 125 Just as in the Jim Crow South, the
realities of Florida balloting demonstrate that, despite its purported
objectivity, this merit-based approach primarily benefits those
already enjoying power. While obsessing about partisan motives that
potentially compromise the integrity of the ballot, the proponents of a
merit-based system elevate concerns about fraud over concerns about
participation. In the name of "ballot integrity," the legacy of race-based
disenfranchisement continues to haunt our nation.
The rhetoric of meritocracy also undermines the capacity of those
who have been disenfranchised to organize for change. The populist
promise of this rhetoric is cabined by a commitment to election
structures that discourage grassroots collective action and dissuade
Id.; see Possible Irregularitiesat the Polls, supra note 119 ("In Miami-Dade, the state's most
populous county, about 3 percent of ballots were excluded from the presidential tally. But in
precincts with a black population of 70 percent or more, about 10 percent were not counted.");
Kim Cobb, Black Leaders Want Action on Florida Vote Complaints, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 30,
2000, at A24, available at 2000 WL 24530801 ("U.S. Rep. Corrine Brown, D-Jacksonville, said
that 16,000 of the 27,000 ballots left uncounted in Duval County were from predominantly black
precincts."). But see Stephen Ansolabehere, Voting Machines, Race, and Equal Protection, 1
ELECTION L.J. 61 (2002) (arguing that nationally, no significant correlation exists between race
and punch card machine-rejected ballots, and that racial disparities are explained by a higher
percentage of less reliable punch card technology in African-American precincts). By contrast,
the voices of certain groups of (primarily Republican) voters received preferential counting
treatment. A complicated political and legal strategy helped ensure that canvassing boards
accepted 41% of flawed absentee military ballots compared to 30% of flawed absentee civilian
ballots. David Barstow & Don Van Natta, Jr., How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas
Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 1, at 1, availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New
York Times File.
123. Mireya Navarro & Somini Sengupta, Arriving at Florida Voting Places, Some Blacks
Found Frustration,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, The
New York Times File; see also Gregory Palast, Florida's "Disappeared Voters":
Disenfranchisedby the GOP, NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 20 (describing the flawed lists used by the
state to purge a disproportionate number of blacks in Florida).
124. SIMSON, supra note 77, at 33.
125. Id. at 16.
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multiracial political activity by organized groups. As Professor Overton
notes, "[a]lthough the Court's facially neutral merit-based criteria focus

on individual responsibility, they interfere primarily not with individual
rights, but with the ability of groups of voters like African-Americans to
identify with one another as a political community, to create alliances
backgrounds, and to use the vote to enact
with others of different
1 26
political change."'
But, no matter: in Bush v. Gore, the conservative majority continues
to see voting as an individual right and reminds us that "[t]he individual
citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the
President of the United States unless and until the state legislature
chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to
appoint members of the electoral college." 127 While the state cannot
overtly fence out a group of voters to arbitrarily deny them an
opportunity to cast their ballots, the state may establish voting rules that
covertly accomplish the same exclusion. 12 8 This means that those who
are functionally illiterate (as are more than forty million adults in this
country)129 or who live in poor counties, without access to the
technology necessary to confirm registration status and ease lines at the
polling place, simply do not enjoy the same "ability" to cast legal votes.
Even when such citizens manage to cast their ballots-because of the
vagaries of state law, antiquated voting technology, as well as the
126. Overton, supra note 49, at 473. I thank Professor Overton for his insightful analysis of
the way that conventions of meritocracy apparently informed the Court's analysis: "Bush v. Gore
rejected the more inclusionary assumptions about democracy articulated in other cases, but...
the Court embraced merit-based assumptions that conditioned political recognition on an
individual voter's capacity to produce a machine-readable ballot." Id. at 472; see also Pamela S.
Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protectionfrom Shaw v. Reno to
Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1345, 1365 (2001) ("There is credible evidence that systems that
disproportionately reject votes both have a racially disparate impact and are more often used in
the populous jurisdictions in which minority voters are concentrated. Thus, the newest equal
protection once again vindicates the interests of middle-class, politically potent voters, while
ignoring the interests of the clause's original beneficiaries.").
127. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam). Citizens have no federally
mandated or constitutionally sacrosanct right to vote. It is up to the various state legislatures to
determine whether to vest the right to vote in the people, and only then does the right become
fundamental and protected based on rights to equal protection. Id. (per curiam). This
requirement means that the rights of voters are only triggered once the ballot is made available;
when the state accedes to allow voters to vote, then it is up to the state to establish the rules for
voting so that a ballot is in fact tabulated. Id. (per curiam).
128. "[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 105 (per
curiam) (quoting Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)).
129. For detailed analysis and statistics about illiteracy in the United States, see the National
Institute for Literacy's website at http://novel.nifl.gov/nifl/faqs.html#literacy%20rates (last
visited Nov. 20, 2002).
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delegation of enormous discretion to local polling officials-some
citizens' votes are still not counted.

III.

RECONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

A survey released December 7, 2000, by the Harvard Vanishing
Voter Project indicated that large majorities of the American people
believed the election procedures had been "unfair to the voters." 130 Not
surprisingly, nationwide, those most likely to feel disenfranchised were
blacks. Moreover, one out of ten blacks reported that they or someone
in their family had trouble voting, according to a national report
produced by Michael Dawson and Lawrence Bobo of the Center for the
Study of Race, Politics and Culture and the W.E.B. Dubois Institute.
The alienation of the black community was also evident in the reaction
of the Congressional Black Caucus, which alone raised formal
objections in the House of Representatives to Florida's slate of Bush
electors. In a poignant column for the Boston Globe, James Carroll
asked: "What does it say that even the most left-wing of white
congressmen and senators have adjusted themselves to the problematic
Bush election, while the Congressional Black Caucus has not?" 1 3 1 He
concluded, "Those who sit atop the social and economic pyramid
always speak
of love, while those at the bottom always speak of
132
justice."'
One thing is certain to those of us who have studied the structure, not
just the mechanics, of our election system: reforms for the tabulation of
ballots alone will not resolve the deep alienation that pervades our
democracy and causes people to not even vote. Turnout in 2000 was
up in Florida and other contested states, primarily as a result of
grassroots efforts to increase participation. In Election 2000, for
example, members of union households (13% of the workforce)
were more likely to vote and to also vote Democratic. 13 3 The key
explanatory factor was not the political preferences of union leaders
who announced early for Gore. It was the grassroots organizing of the
130. Press Release, The Vanishing Voter, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics
and Public Policy at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, As Election
Contest Drags On, Americans' Dissatisfaction Grows (Dec. 7, 2000), available at
http://www.vanishingvoter.org/releases/12-07-00.shtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
131.

James Carroll, Editorial, Black Caucus Sends a Message About Justice, BOSTON GLOBE,

Jan. 9, 2001, at A19, availableat 2001 WL 3914134.
132. Id.
133. University of Delaware, Exit Poll Results-Election 2000, at http://www.udel.edu/poscir/
road/course/exitpollsindex.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2002). This statistic also demonstrates that
people in unions have higher turnout rates because union members represent 16% of the
electorate, whereas they represent only 13% of the adult population. See id.
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rank and file. 134 But a report from the Committee for the Study of the
American Electorate ("CSAE"), a nonprofit research organization,
suggested that such efforts will not increase turnout in future
elections. 135 As more and more power gravitates to a permanent set of
political elites, a process that discourages their active involvement has
increasingly marginalized many Americans.
Last year, the registration of Democrats continued a thirty-six-year
decline and registration for third parties and independents streamed
upward. Upgrading voting equipment and creating uniform ballot
counting procedures will not do much to alter these demographic
changes, which suggest the withdrawal of many citizens from our
current two-party system.
"The root of the turnout problem is
motivational" and not technical, the CSAE report said. 136 In other
words, the skewed incentive structure of our current two party
duopoly-with its candidate-centered, elite driven set of rulesdiscourages a large number of people from participating in the most
basic aspects of our political process.
It is the political process itself that needs fixing. On this point, John
Dewey had it exactly right: "[t]he cure for ailments in democracy is
more democracy." 137 We need to imagine systems that encourage
greater levels of voter participation, that lead to a higher degree of
confidence in election results and the related policy outcomes, and that
encourage ordinary citizens to join together more effectively to play a
role in the process of self-government beyond just voting. Indeed, we
might jumpstart a different kind of conversation by examining the
systems adopted by other mature democracies as well as those countries
that had the benefit of building on other's mistakes.
For example, a 1995 survey of twenty industrialized democracies
revealed a number of practices other countries have implemented to
restrict the role of private money in legislative elections. Canada and
Great Britain, for instance, both limit legislative candidates' campaign
spending to under $25,000.138 Perhaps more practically, the United
134. For a sample discussion of some of these grassroots union activities in the last two
elections, see AFL-CIO, Election Day Difference-New Working Family Voters!! (2000), at
http://www.aflcio.org/news/2000/1026_voterreg.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2002), and AFL-CIO,
Labor '98 Mobilized Members Around Working Family Issues (1998), at http://www.aflcio.org/
labor98/mobil.htm (last visit Nov. 20, 2002).
135. Voter Turnout Rose in 2000, But No Lasting Impact Is Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001,
at A12, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
136. Id.
137. John Dewey, quoted in MORONE, supra note 19, at 322.
138. Steven Hill, For Campaign Finance Laws that Work, Look Abroad, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 28, 1995, at 19.
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States could follow other democracies in providing greater public
financing of elections and requiring media organizations to provide
equal, free advertising access. It is worth noting that fifteen of the
twenty democracies surveyed "prohibit paid political advertisements as
a way of keeping the playing field even." 139 A comparative analysis
also supplies insights to revitalize American democracy in other areas.
Turnout could be increased by voting on a weekend or holiday rather
than a workday, 14 as most democracies do, and weighing the benefits
of mandatory voting, 14 1 as a few countries have. The most important
lesson other countries have to teach the United States, however,
involves changing our electoral system to promote the political efficacy
of local grassroots organizations.
Before describing a range of comparative examples that might help
inspire a broad, multiracial and progressive coalition committed to
reviving American democracy, let me set forth several assumptions on
which this exploration proceeds. First, blacks already possess a high
level of group consciousness and understand many of the systemic
biases that render the country more oligarchic than meritocratic, which
means they must play an active role for any pro-democracy movement
to be successful. However, this movement would obviously also reach
out to other people of color, poor whites, young people, organized labor
and, of course, other potential allies such as the middle- and upper-class
progressives that currently form the backbone of the Green Party. Its
members would be identified by their politics and their willingness to
link their fate to those currently most disadvantaged.
Second, a pro-democracy movement might start with basic reforms
such as twenty-four hour voting on a national holiday, but it must not
stop there. Uniform national standards, imposed top-down, do little to
change the incentive structure for participation. Giving people a reason
to vote is by far the most vital element of a democracy movement. Still,
People need to be given
merely voting is not even enough.
opportunities to participate and contribute between elections in order for
Such
the seeds of meaningful democratic change to take root.
opportunities require intermediate institutions that help educate,
organize, and mobilize grassroots involvement in the conversation of
democracy.

139. Id.
140. Indeed, the recent Electoral Reform Commission chaired by former Presidents Ford and
Carter proposed just such a reform.
141. While this may initially seem to violate personal autonomy, it is not a greater civic
burden than, for instance, requiring eighteen-year-old-males to register for the draft.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

Finally, the short-term prospects for fundamentally transforming
American politics along the lines I outline below are admittedly quite
low. The recent experience of the Greens suggests that without
structural changes in our winner-take-all rules, it is difficult to field
candidates at the national level who will alter the debate and gain an
institutional foothold in the forums of representative democracy. Many
third parties have tried and failed to become legitimate contenders in
American politics over the last hundred years. On the other hand,
alternative strategies for advancing a progressive political agenda have
also failed in the electoral arena where efforts to 1move
the Democratic
42
effect.
opposite
the
had
often
have
Party leftwards
Therefore, the goal of this thought experiment is much more modest.
I hope simply to demonstrate once again just how poorly the country
currently represents the interests of poor and working-class people of all
races-both by normative and comparative standards. With that lesson
in mind, committed reformers working in various institutional settings
could redouble their efforts to learn from the experience of people of
color in order to effect the fundamental change necessary to provide all
Americans with equitable political and social citizenship. Here are
three approaches to re-invigorate, at the very least, a deeper discussion
of the failings of our democracy so that the reforms pursued in the wake
of Election 2000 go beyond cosmetic changes merely involving the
mechanics of voting.
A. The Emergence of Grassroots and Locally-Based Parties
First, a new party could seek political influence to mobilize and
organize at the grassroots level rather than to start out as a force in
national politics. What might set such a new political party apart from
past attempts along these lines is if it were to begin by (1) fielding
candidates primarily in majority-minority districts and then (2)
organizing a new political movement based on the experiences and
interests of people of color and other under-represented groups.' 4 3 Such
a strategy would have real potential if the party persuaded at least some
142. Joel Rogers, The New Party-Now More than Ever: Rogers Replies, 18 BOSTON REV.
(Jan.-Feb. 1993), available at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BRl8.1/revive.html (last visited Nov.
20, 2002). On the other hand, it might be useful to study the example of the Christian Right,
which started at the grassroots level, gradually got elected to school boards and city councils and
developed a much louder voice within the Republican Party precisely because they provided
important local organizing to win elections.
143. An interesting side note is that, according to the Supreme Court's current, confused
jurisprudence regarding majority-minority districts, the new party could seek to draw majorityminority districts more easily than the traditional parties because it would clearly be doing so
primarily for political rather than racial motives. See Easely v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
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of the current (Democratic) representatives of these districts to switch
party affiliation. The feelings of profound alienation voiced by many
black and Latino elected officials-even in relation to their fellow
144
Democrats-suggests this is not an entirely implausible scenario.
Moreover, as the example of the British Labour Party proves,
progressive third parties can achieve electoral breakthroughs even in
winner-take-all electoral systems such as ours.
In the late 1800s, two parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals,
dominated British politics. 14 5 The Liberals were the more progressive
of the two parties, and they had enjoyed strong union support as well as
the electoral backing of most workers. However, by the early years of
the new century, many union activists became dissatisfied by their
inability to influence the Liberal platform to any significant degree, and
they decided to form a new Labour Party.
The Labour Party wisely coordinated its efforts closely with the
Liberals in its early years. Eager not to divide the "progressive" vote in
Britain's electoral system that, like our own, is based on single-member
plurality district elections, the Liberals gave Labour a free hand against
the Conservatives in a number of constituencies. By 1910, Labour won
6% of the nationwide vote and forty seats in the House of Commons.
The Labour Party gained more and more votes as Britain's political
structure continued to be transformed in the wake of technological
advancement, social movements, and the dislocations and reforms that
resulted from two world wars. Within a half century of its creation,
Labour stormed to an impressive electoral victory that allowed it to
implement dramatic sociopolitical reforms.
The experience of British Labour is far from unusual internationally.
Indeed, although a number of countries conduct elections based
144. As described above, it is often the black elected officials who stand alone to protest
obvious injustices, while their white Democratic colleagues, though sympathetic, sit back,
constrained to follow the rules. Carroll, supra note 131. There is great potential for a third party
with roots in majority-black districts since so many members of the Congressional Black Caucus
already serve as caseworkers for members of marginalized communities in general rather than
simply the district from which they are elected. For instance, in 1995, a full 30% of all calls
seeking assistance from Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney of Georgia came from individuals
outside her district, and 80% of these persons were "low-income minority individuals." Lisa A.
Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent Community in the Post-Shaw Era, 49
VAND. L. REv., 227, 284 n.179 (1996).
145. There is a rich literature that analyzes the rise of the British Labour Party. Readers
interested in exploring this topic in greater detail might consult the following: GREGORY
LUEBBERT, LIBERALISM,

FASCISM OR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1991); HENRY PELLING, THE

ORIGINS OF THE LABOUR PARTY 1880-1900 (1965); MARTIN PUGH, THE MAKING OF MODERN
BRITISH POLITICS, 1867-1939 (1993); DUNCAN TANNER, POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE LABOUR

PARTY, 1900-1918 (1990).
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on winner-take-all districts, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., reported in his
comparative study of twenty industrialized democracies that the
complete two-party dominance in the United States is unique. "[O]nly
in the United States did the two largest parties consistently win more
than 90 percent of the vote in legislative elections." 146 While the
Supreme Court decisions mentioned in Part I of this Essay place
additional barriers on the formation of politically significant third
parties in the United States, they certainly do not create insurmountable
obstacles. In the mid-1960s---despite tremendous legal and political
discrimination-the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party mounted
an impressive challenge to the Democrats and Republicans. This
progressive party, dedicated to promoting the full citizenship rights of
black Americans, fielded candidates in elections for the United States
147
Congress who won the support of a majority of black voters.
Imagine the potential such a party could have now with the advent of
majority-minority districts.
However, another equally important question remains. Even if a
progressive party were to overcome the admittedly significant barriers
to entry in our current political system and won as many as say two
dozen seats in Congress, could it really have enough influence to foster
significant advancements in social and political citizenship in this
country? There are at least three reasons why the answer might
be a plausible yes. First, a political organizing effort that began in
communities of color could track other cultural cross-over movements
to give voice to the extreme alienation of the poor and young voters of
all races who care little about the major issues emphasized in recent
campaigns, such as tax relief for the middle and upper classes and
prescription drug plans for the elderly. As Mary Eakle, 25, a $7-anhour assistant deli manager put it during the 2000 presidential contest:
"None of what they're saying is about us." 14 8 Local political
organizations, developed in conjunction with issues of concern in the
community, would encourage participation through local forums, doorknocking campaigns, and face-to-face contact on issues of concern as
defined by the people in the communities themselves.
146.

G.

BINGHAM

POWELL,

JR.,

ELECTIONS

AS

INSTRUMENTS

OF

DEMOCRACY:

MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS 90 (2000); see also id. at 28-29 (describing how
the number of parties winning votes generally declines in countries with single-member election
rules).
147. Dan Nicolai, The Law and the Struggle for the Soul of the Democratic Party 26 (Dec. 20,
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
148. Dale Russakoff, Cut Out of Prosperity, Cutting Out at the Polls, WASH. POST, Oct. 24,
2000, at Al, availableat 2000 WL 25424189; see also Dale Russakoff, Young Voters See Little
in It for Them, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2000, at A1, availableat 2000 WL 25425871.
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Second, the party could use municipalities, counties, or even states
where it gained sufficient influence as laboratories of democracy in
promoting individuals' social and political rights through the
implementation of policies ranging from a living wage to proportional
representation. Successful experiments would serve as models and
encourage the two major parties to promulgate similar national (or
statewide) reforms. The experience of Canada's National Democratic
Party ("NDP")-the country's only significant party advocating social
democracy-teaches relevant lessons in this respect. While never
winning more than 20% of the vote in a federal election, NDP
provincial governments implemented progressive labor and health care
reforms that were so popular that the federal government eventually
extended their basic principles throughout the nation. This example was
most notably the case in the development of Canada's universal, singlepayer health care system, which was first promulgated by the NDP
provincial government of Saskatchewan. 149
Third, the existence of a locally-initiated third party might pressure
the Democratic Party to advocate more progressive policies because
Democrats would no longer be able to take the support of black voters
for granted. 15 However, the experience of the initial alliance between
the Liberals and Labour in Britain suggested that local, progressive
political parties would have to work with, rather than against, the
Democrats. Such a strategy would avoid splitting the black, brown or
progressive vote and throwing elections to conservative Republicans-a
danger few are likely to underestimate after the 2000 presidential
election. 151
149. Peter Dreier & Elaine Bernard, Kinder, Gentler Canada,AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1993, at
85, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V4/12/dreier-p.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2002);
see also Elaine Bernard, The Difference a New Party Would Make, 18 BOSTON REV. (Jan.-Feb.
1993), available at http://bostonreview.mit.edu.BR18.1/revive.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
Bernard's piece is in the context of a series of articles about the New Party, a political party
founded in the early 1990s and with quite similar goals to the objectives of the hypothetical
Progressive Party. In my view, a crucial difference is that the New Party-while clearly
demonstrating an admirable interest in racial justice and working with black elected officialsdoes not focus to the same degree on the grassroots involvement of poor people of color as the
Progressive Party would. Nevertheless, the New Party is a step in the right direction that could
coalesce with the Progressive Party to advocate transformative democratic change.
150. For a theoretical discussion of this point, see POWELL, supra note 146, at 198.
151. Therefore, this coordination should also appeal to Democrats as long as these locallygrounded, grassroots organizations could reasonably threaten to run viable candidates in a number
of constituencies. Attracting some black incumbents to the party at the local level would
immediately lend credibility to this threat. On the other hand, as Professor Heather Gerken
reminded me, third-party candidates would in fact sometimes result in Democratic losses.
Indeed, for third parties to have any effect, the threat of defection must be credible, which means
that there will be short-term costs.
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In other words, a third-party might force the Democrats to alter their
policies; it might also force them to become advocates for citizens to
exercise their political clout. On the other hand, incumbents of all races
generally have a vested interest in the hierarchical status quo. Many
black incumbents have had to work hard to curry favor with wealthy
(black and white) constituents and businesses in order to accumulate the
war chests necessary to run for office; as a result, they have an
important disincentive to joining a new grassroots political organization.
Thus, a scenario that seeks to disrupt hierarchy or at least to minimize it
may need to be accompanied by more dramatic structural changes that
elevate the role of political issues and political engagement rather than
rely solely on the sympathies of political candidates. It is to these
structural changes that I now turn.
B. ProportionalRepresentation
Some might say that 225 years after the American Revolution, it is
time for the United States to consider the advantages of democratic
models that do not stem from the legacy of British rule. A second
thought experiment is to imagine that a pro-democracy movement
generates activity around the issue of structural reform, including the
adoption, via referenda or initiative, of proportional representation
("PR") systems starting at the local level and then expanding statewide.
As more people become aware of the "sclerotic" effects on voter choice
from incumbent-driven gerrymandering of election districts, reformers
may be able to generate renewed interest in PR, which152allows voters to
"district themselves" by the way they cast their ballots.
The most common type of PR is the party list system. The basic
principle behind party list systems is that each party offers a list of
152. Incumbent politicians are increasingly able to use districting to make elections less
competitive. Drawing district lines to create safe seats for incumbents of both major parties
suppresses voter turnout and saps democratic choice. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying
text (discussing the effects of political redistricting and the Court's application of heightened
scrutiny). As the 2002 House of Representative elections demonstrate, the two parties often
cooperate to manipulate electoral outcomes. In 2002, seventy-eight of the House races had only
one major party candidate; only four incumbents lost to non-incumbent challengers. Email from
Rob Richie, Center for Voting and Democracy to Lani Guinier (Nov. 18, 2002, 13:35:50 EST).
Similarly, Robin Toner writes in the New York Times soon after the election:
[Tlhis year, redistricting became, in many states, an exercise in protecting incumbents.
As a result, [independent analyst] Charles Cook listed just 45 races-out of 435 in the
House-as competitive in October; at the same time 10 years ago, there were 151
competitive races. Only 25 incumbents won with less than 55 percent of the vote,
according to another independent analyst, Rhodes Cook.
Robin Toner, In the House at Least, Moderation is No Virtue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, § 4, at
3, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
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candidates in each constituency. Seats are then awarded to each party in
proportion to its support in the constituency, and individuals fill the
available seats based on their position on the list-for example, if a
party wins 30% of the vote and earns three of ten city council seats,
only the top three persons on that party's list will gain places in the
council. How the order of the list is determined is just one of the
53
several important variations possible in party list systems. 1
Because list systems tend to use districts with large numbers of seats,
they are generally the best arrangements to ensure proportionality
between votes cast for, and legislative seats won by, political parties.
By placing emphasis on parties rather than individual candidates, party
list systems also promote campaigns based on issues and platforms.
This focus helps to ensure that the substantive needs of more citizens
are addressed in the political arena. Party list systems also encourage
grassroots social movements to spawn electorally-oriented political
parties, because such parties need capture a far smaller share of the
electorate than their counterparts in a winner-take-all system to win a
council or school board seat. Moreover, PR promotes greater grassroots
mobilization within the confines of the major political parties. Because
PR encourages parties to emphasize policies rather than candidates,
different constituencies have a strong incentive to organize their
supporters in order to influence the party platform on the issues that
matter most to them. The order of names on party lists is an issue
around which constituencies can mobilize and negotiate without
resulting in all-or-nothing victories of one faction or another as occurs
in political systems in which each party runs just one candidate per
contest. As a result,
women and racial minorities often fare better in
54
1
systems.
list
party
Cross-national comparisons of West European nations reveal that
roughly twice as many women are elected to parliament in countries
that use party list systems. 155 Similarly, the use of party list systems in

153. The major variations among party list systems are: (1) the formula used to award seats at
the constituency level; (2) whether there is a formula to correct any imbalances in the
proportionality of representation from the constituency level; (3) whether lists are closed,
meaning their order is determined entirely by the party, or open, allowing voters to influence
which candidates, not just which parties, gain representation; and (4) the existence and level of a
minimum threshold for legislative representation. GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 101, at 309.
154. DOUGLAS J. AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT Box: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO VOTING SYSTEMS
88-89 (2000) [hereinafter AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT BOX]; IDEA HANDBOOK, supra note 106,
at 62-63.
155. GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 101, at 322. Not only do the countries with party list
systems vastly outperform the single-member district systems used by Britain and France, they
also fare vastly better than Ireland and Malta, the two countries that currently use Single-
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democracies with deep racial divisions like South Africa and Namibia
has resulted in impressively diverse national legislatures, even when
156
race continues to shape voting preferences and party affiliation.
However, PR is considered a radical alternative here in the United
States, even though most western democracies, other than former
colonies of Great Britain, use some form of it and, in a modified form, it
was used for 100 years in Illinois. Among the most common criticisms
of party list systems in particular, and PR in general, are that their high
level of proportionality results in an excessive number of parties and
thus legislative gridlock. These concerns reflect our preference for
election systems that promote stability and measured change over
robust, participatory forms of democracy. Critics depend upon
supposedly paradigmatic cases, which conclusively illustrate the havoc
that PR can wreak on political systems. Some students of both presentday Israel and Weimar Germany have suggested that the type of PR
used in these two states fostered an excessive number of parties that in
turn promoted high levels of government instability and paralysis, and
ultimately-at least in the case of interwar Germany--devastating
consequences. However, a deeper analysis of the two cases challenges
the idea that they offer a general indictment against all electoral systems
based on proportional representation.
Israel and Weimar Germany both conducted elections using
particular variants of PR that allow a great number of parties to be
represented in the national legislature. The type of PR used in Weimar
Germany promoted the multiplication of political parties because as
long as a party won at least 30,000 votes in one of the thirty-five
constituencies, it could count on roughly proportional representation
in the Reichstag. 157 What the critics really objected to was the
combination of PR with a tiny entry threshold that permitted very small

transferable voting ("STV"), a more candidate-centered form of PR, to elect their parliaments. Id.
It is, however, worth noting that in Australia, women fare far better in elections to the Senate,
which use STV, than they do in contests for the House of Representatives, which are based on
single-member districts. AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT Box, supra note 154, at 107; see also infra
note 165 (discussing STV).
156. IDEA HANDBOOK, supra note 106, at 62-63, 70.
157. E.J. FEUCHTWANGER, FROM WEIMAR TO HITLER: GERMANY, 1918-1933, at 42 (1993).
That the multiplication of political parties corresponded to interwar Germany's bitter
sociopolitical cleavages was in part a function of the very small threshold for representation of
each party. Post-war Italy is another country that opponents of PR often cite as a paradigmatic
case of the havoc wreaked by the multiplication of small parties PR supposedly promotes. Like
Weimar Germany and Israel, for most of the post-war period, Italy used a system of PR with an
extremely low threshold of exclusion.
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parties to enjoy disproportionate power. 15 8 However, our winner-takeall system might have made matters'even worse. In 1933, in the last
"free" election of interwar Germany, the Nazis were by far the largest
party with 44% of the vote, yet they only won 288 of the 647
parliamentary seats. "Goering said at his trial that under the British
[winner-take-all] system that election would have given the Nazis every
15 9
seat in the country, and he cannot have been far wrong."'
In Israel, the entire country serves as one district to elect 120
members of parliament, and the threshold of exclusion is a mere
1.5%.160 Simply instituting a 5% threshold of exclusion would reduce
16 1
the number of parties in the 2002 legislature from fifteen to seven.
Israel also presents a problematic case for comparison because it is a
religious rather than a secular democracy, which increases and
intensifies the social cleavages that underlie Israeli politics. 162 On the
other hand, PR does allow the number of political parties in the Israeli
parliament to be more fully representative of the range of opinions
within the country. In an ironic, but revealing, paradox, Palestinians
rate Israeli democracy higher than American winner-take-all
democracy. "The reason," says Jon B. Alterman, an analyst at the
United States Institute of Peace, "is that they see American democracy
as beholden to interest groups, whereas Israeli democracy reflects what
163
the Israeli people want."
158. Such a 5% threshold would have been enough to keep the Nazis out of the Reichstag as
late as the elections of 1928. While a winner-take-all system would have achieved a similar result
in 1928, it would have probably grossly over-represented the Nazis in the national legislature
beginning in 1930, when, with 18.3% of the national vote, the Nazis became the second largest
party. Id. at 42, 326.
159. ENID LAKEMAN, POWER TO ELECT: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
68 (1982). Among other obstacles, the anti-Nazi parties faced press censorship, prohibition of
meetings, and police intimidation and violence during this "free" election. FEUCHTWANGER,
supra note 157, at 313-14.
160. Giovanni Sartori, The Party-Effects of Electoral Systems, in PARTIES, ELECTIONS AND
CLEAVAGES: ISRAEL IN COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 13, 27 (Reuven Y.
Hazan & Moshe Maor eds., 2000). Before 1992, the threshold of exclusion was 1%. Id.
161. This data is based on a table provided by Reuven Y. Hazan and Moshe Maor. Id. at 6.
162. Id. at 26. On a 7.0 point-scale designed by Arend Lijphart, Peter J. Bowman, and
Reuven Y. Hazan to measure the number and intensity of sociopolitical cleavages in thirty-six
democracies since World War II, Israel now scores a 5.0. "This is a remarkably high number
compared with.., the other 35 democratic party systems in the 1945-1996 period, the highest of
which is 3.5 and found in only one country (Finland)." By contrast, the United States receives a
score of 1.0. Arend Lijphart et al., Party Systems and Issue Dimensions: Israeland Thirty-Five
Other Old and New Democracies Compared, in PARTIES, ELECTIONS AND CLEAVAGES: ISRAEL
IN COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 29, 33-37, 48 (Reuven Y. Hazan & Moshe
Maor eds., 2000).
163. Elaine Sciolino, Who Hates the U.S.? Who Loves it?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, § 4, at
1, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File (quoting Jon B. Alterman who
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Critics of party list systems also contend that they do not nourish
close ties between constituents and their representatives based on easily
observed geographic proximity or identity. 164 However, there exists a
representational system that combines the numerous advantages of party
list systems while simultaneously promoting strong geographic ties
between constituents and their representatives: it is called mixedmember proportional voting ("MMP"). 165 Under MMP, voters make
two choices. Their first vote is used to elect individual candidates in
single-member district plurality contests, just as in most elections in the
United States. The second vote is for a party, and the remaining
legislative seats (in general roughly one half) are allocated through a
party list system to ensure that each party that meets the system's
minimum threshold of support has proportional representation in the
legislature. 166 In recent years, the clear advantages of MMP, first
implemented in 1949 by West Germany, has made it quite popular
among new democracies and states considering major electoral reform.
Even by the elevated standards of Western Europe, under MMP postwar
Germany has witnessed high turnout, 167 high levels of proportionality
between votes cast and candidates elected, and large numbers of women
in parliament. 168 Germany's 5% threshold of exclusion has also helped
prevent a multiplicity of tiny parties, and the government has enjoyed
169
stability without gridlock.

has written extensively on the flow of information in the Arab world. "Whenever there is a
survey of Palestinians, they always rate Israeli democracy higher than American democracy.").
164. AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT BOX, supra note 154, at 31.
165. Single-transferable voting ("STV") is another form of PR that does maintain close
constituent-representative ties. However, it remains a candidate-centered system. Therefore, in
my view, STV is less desirable than PR systems based on party lists. Still, we should remember
Douglas Amy's admonition that "[tihe primary danger facing the PR movement is not that it
might opt for the 'wrong' version, but that it could waste valuable time and energy squabbling
over which system is best." AMY, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES, supra note 88, at 233.
166. AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT Box, supra note 154, at 90.
167. In its most recent parliamentary elections in September 2002, a full 79.1% of the German
electorate turned out to vote, despite poor weather in much of the country. And this impressive
participation rate was actually down slightly since the 1998 elections, when turnout was 82.2%.
Steven Erlanger, Germany's Leader Retains His Power After Tight Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File. This article also
provides a helpful overview of Germany's electoral system for interested readers.
168. GALLAGHER ET. AL., supra note 101, at 260, 322. Not surprisingly, German women are
three times more likely to win seats through party lists than through single-member districts. This
pattern holds in New Zealand and Italy, which recently adopted electoral systems that include the
use of both party lists and single-member plurality districts. ROB RICHIE & STEVEN HILL,
REFLECTING Us ALL: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 16-17 (1999).
169. RICHIE & HILL, supra note 168, at 30.
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C. Moving Toward the Twenty-First Century

The creation of locally-based but politically-networked third or fourth
parties and the use of proportional representation are both important
sites for engagement and reform. However, they cannot by themselves
guarantee the type of grassroots organization I have argued is crucial to
re-invigorating American democracy. For instance, women and people
of color who gain office under PR can still be token representatives
without substantive policy-making influence. Facilitating the electoral
success of parties with progressive public policy agendas is a good thing
in my view, but the crucial connections between the voters and the
decision-making process may lapse without ongoing opportunities for
citizen participation. Therefore, it is helpful to imagine the role that
local and interactive grassroots experiments can play in promoting
broad-based democratic participation independent of the political
structure or party system in place.
Perhaps the most unlikely examples of alternative forms of popular
engagement come from Brazil. 170 The work of a Brazilian dramatist
illustrates that it is possible to provide all citizens not just with a voice
to be heard, but also with a real role to play in the democratic decisions
that are most important to them. When his theater company lost its
funding, Augusto Boal moved to dismantle it in style. He wanted to
showcase his troupe in the event that attracted large numbers of local
residents-the annual Carnival. To secure a place, he had to find a
political party that would share its space with him. One party agreed to
give him space if one of his members ran for office on the party list.
Boal agreed and ran on the platform, "Vote for me, And Elect My
Theater Company."' 17 1 He won two terms as a city councilman. Rather
than hiring legislative aides, he hired members of the company to
organize his constituents into issue-oriented groups. These groups
worked through local public policy concerns using techniques of forum
theater and role-plays. Each of the seventeen constituent groups then
170.

See generallyAUGUSTO BOAL, LEGISLATIVE THEATRE: USING PERFORMANCE TO MAKE

POLITICS (1998). Boal describes his actual experiences running as Vereador in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, and getting elected for two terms. During that period he introduced successfully thirteen
laws that were drafted by constituency groups using Forum Theater exercises that helped citizens
"[d]evelop their taste for political discussion (democracy) and their desire to develop their own
artistic abilities (popular art)." Id. at 9. Boal hired members of his theater group to function as
"jokers" or wild cards who facilitated the development of seventeen constituency groups, each of
whom worked through the improvisation of possible solutions to locally generated problems. Id.
at 46. Those solutions were then converted into bills and introduced into the legislature by Boal.
Id. at 94.
171. Id. at 15 ("For the first time in the history of the theatre and the history of politics, there
opened up the possibility of a whole theatre company being elected to parliament.").
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enacted an improvisational play at a theater festival that demonstrated
their view of important problems they faced and presented possible
solutions. The productions were critiqued and revised based on
audience feedback. Several of the proposals were then drafted into
bills, which Boal introduced. Some became law. Nevertheless, Boal
played his formal role with a more transitive understanding of the
representational relationship between
him and his constituents; he never
172
own.
his
of
bill
a
once introduced
The work of Augusto Boal is novel, and it moves us to the beginnings
of an alternative vision of democracy-one that does not fetishize the
role of a meritorious or otherwise deserving representative but views the
representative as one member of an interactive community. It is a
radically unfamiliar vision to most Americans, yet it is grounded in the
same despair that millions of Americans experienced after the 2000
election. Boal asked a simple question of the other supporters of a
Brazilian presidential candidate who won thirty-one million votes and
lost by a narrow margin: "We Are 31 Million: Now What?"' 173 Rather
than simply relying on technical solutions to fix the winner-take-all
character of Brazil's presidential elections, Boal turned to a local form
of citizen engagement. 174 His experiments in what he calls "legislative
theater" illustrate the dual power of organizing local residents. He
invited their participation in ways that continued even after his election.
He also facilitated opportunities for his constituents to generate
innovative solutions to longstanding public policy dilemmas.

IV. RESPONSE TO CRITICISM OF THIS ESSAY
Thus far, I have attempted to identify the anti-democratic strains in
our political system using some thought experiments to help us reflect
on these structural problems. In the last section of this Essay, I would
like to explain why I believe in participatory democracy and embrace it
not as a tactic to achieve particular substantive ends, but as an end in
itself. In a country with such a longstanding rhetorical and symbolic
commitment to democracy, it may seem intuitive that more democracy
(however defined) is a good thing.
172. Id. at 105.
173. Jan Cohen-Cruz, Theatricalizing Politics, in PLAYING BOAL: THEATRE, THERAPY,
AcTIVISM 227, 233 (Mady Schutzman & Jan Cohen-Cruz eds., 1994).
174. Although Boal's experience may seem improbable by United States standards, there are
many local examples of similar efforts. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 80, at ch. 6; see also
Tamar Lewin, One State Finds Secret to Strong Civic Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, § 1, at
1,available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File (describing the unlikely roles
that people without a high school education play in local government in New Hampshire).
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However, Professor Louis Michael Seidman has offered an important
critique of democratic process that deserves a response. 175 Professor
Seidman begins his analysis by pointing out the tremendous inequalities
in income and wealth that continue to grow in our country-inequalities
that have resulted in high levels of poverty and over one in ten
American households not having enough food to eat. 176 Professor
Seidman suggests that "the American people would not casually and
unthinkingly accept this obscenity unless there were complex and
powerful legitimating structures in place allowing them to distance
themselves from it."' 177 He then describes four such legitimating
structures. The first, which operates at a mass level, is a belief that
America is a meritocracy where "people get more or less what they
deserve."' 17 8 Related to this mass belief in meritocracy are two
additional legitimating structures that operate on elites: (2) a belief in
economic efficiency as requiring as little redistribution and regulation as
possible in order to maximize the total pie, and (3) a belief in the
rhetoric of impotence-that resource maldistribution results from
complex phenomena over which we have little control, and "[e]fforts to
deal with it are bound to have unintended and counterproductive
consequences."' 179 The fourth legitimating structure, according to
Professor Seidman, is democracy itself: "the claim is that the current
distribution of power and wealth is justified because it is produced by a
political process that is open to all."' 180 This is the most powerful of the
four, in part because it operates on both elites and the general
population. 18'
Let me begin by pointing out that I agree with much of Professor
Seidman's analysis. I agree that our country's (racially-correlated) level
of poverty is dangerous and destabilizing. As earlier parts of this Essay
make clear, I agree that we must de-construct the meritocracy and
demonstrate how it operates to perpetuate the maldistribution of
opportunities. I also agree with Professor Seidman's insightful critique
that ideas of economic efficiency and the182rhetoric of impotence trump
and cabin efforts to redistribute resources.

175. See Louis Michael Seidman, Democracy and Legitimation: A Response to Professor
Guinier, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 77 (2002).
176. Id. at 77.
177. Id. at 77-78.
178. Id. at 78.
179. Id. at 78-79.
180. Id. at 79.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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Where we disagree, of course, is about my belief in democracy.
Professor Seidman's main point is that without a substantive vision of
social justice, an emphasis on democracy is unlikely to combat the
socioeconomic deprivation endured by tens of millions of Americans. 183
I do not quarrel with this claim and yet I do not believe, as Professor
Seidman apparently does, that democratic practice and substantive
184
justice are unrelated, even mutually exclusive.
The key differences, perhaps, between Professor Seidman and myself
are that Professor Seidman equates democracy with voting, assumes
that conservative majorities will out-vote progressive minorities,
measures principled political legitimacy in winner-take-all terms, and
185
isolates organizing techniques as distinct from democratic practice.
He perceives a zero-sum trade-off between substantive and procedural
justice such that just outcomes require "painful, sometimes
unprincipled, compromise, postponing demands that cannot in justice be
postponed, and1 86carefully constructing coalitions with partners we
secretly'detest."
For me, democracy and substantive justice are dynamic, contingent,
and interdependent variables. Substantive justice is rarely sustainable
when arbitrarily imposed by fiat or achieved by "painful, sometimes
unprincipled, compromise" that unravels over time.
Nor can
progressives claim victory when we change minds without achieving
structural reforms or achieve particular legislative or electoral outcomes
simply through the process of counting votes.
Let me be clear. Voting or counting votes does not a democratic
practice make. Democratic practices are those that value powersharing, invite broad participation, engage stakeholders in local
decision-making about concrete problems, and yield creative solutions
that are nevertheless subject to critical feedback. By providing people
with the organizational tools they need to overcome the deep, racialized
inequalities that continue to persist in this country, democratic practices
educate, motivate, and transform. 187 As Texas organizer Ernesto
Cortes says: "We've got to get past the dominant ideology that says
we're clients and consumers and that politics is about electronic
plebescites .... We've got to develop a civic culture of conversation
183. Id. at 77.
184. According to Professor Seidman, "no amount of tinkering with forms of democracy is
likely to achieve social justice." Id. at 83.
185. Id. at 83-84.
186. Id. at 87-88.
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and house meetings and public actions and negotiations and
reciprocity."'88
A commitment to sharing power that invites continuous participation
by the relevant stakeholders over time is compatible with, and indeed
foundational to, a commitment to both democracy and social justice. It
is also the essence of good organizing. Democratic practice sustains the
kinds of vital social movements that energize political activism and
social change. Such movements may be animated by substantive ideas
but these movements are most successful when they use democratic
means to realize their ends. In the Southern civil rights movement, for
example:
[O]rganizers used participatory democracy to school local residents in
the practices of politics, thus exploiting the developmental benefits of
the form. ... [The movement] combined practical organizing with a
vision of radical social change, sought local gains while exposing to
the nation the injustices of Southern apartheid, and treated
participatory decision-making both as a strategy and as an end in
itself. 189

The relationship between social justice and participatory democracy
is being explored systematically in the work of those, sometimes
called the "new governance" critics, and elsewhere referred to as
democratic experimentalists. 190 These academics evaluate and compare
innovative local efforts "to mobilize the contextual intelligence that
only citizens possess through mechanisms for community participation
in deliberation about problems, in developing and deciding among

188. Id. at 176.

189. Id. at 2, 199. An exclusive preoccupation with substantive justice misses this core
democratic claim, which is rooted in ideas of dignity, self-respect, voice, and the desire to be
heard. A focus only on the substantive outcomes also ignores the way the distribution of power
helped create the substantive problem in the first place. If the problem is there because of power
inequality, then the problem cannot be fixed without acknowledging and addressing that
inequality. There are no short cuts around the fundamental challenge that unequal access to
power presents. Of course democratic practice often falls short of effectively redressing these
inequities; yet, the very relevance of such efforts reflects the substantive and moral content of
democratic commitments. I am indebted to Sociologist Marshall Ganz for this formulation.
190. Jennifer Gordon, New Governance Models, New Roles for Rights: Lessons from the
Underground Economy 4, 43 (Nov. 4, 2002) (unpublished typescript, on file with author); see
also Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM.

L. REv. 267 (1998) (discussing a new form of governance where power is decentralized, enabling
citizens to use their local knowledge to find innovative solutions to their circumstances, while
coordinating bodies at the regional and national level share this collective knowledge with others
facing similar situations).
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creative solutions, and in implementing those decisions." 1 91 Whether
the context involves issues of the environment or school reform, local
participants are called on "not merely to express an opinion-or
' 192
demand a solution-but to help formulate and implement solutions."
The new governance scholars conclude that the fallibility of wellintentioned social policy requires opportunities
for grassroots
1 93
participation, experimentation, and benchmarking.
I, for one, don't necessarily know in advance what the most just
policy outcome is in all situations or how to achieve it. Part of the
impulse for my belief in democracy is that the people themselves have
superior wisdom in so many ways to those of us who have superior
book learning. Thus, my argument for democracy draws on the
interdisciplinary new governance scholarship, as well as the old school
tradition of organizing, to suggest that ordinary people should be
empowered to play an active role in public policy debates, where
"people's interests may be transformed through collective reflection
and deliberation," and where they can develop and
implement creative
19 4
strategies to address important issues in their lives.
When stakeholders play a vital role in deliberation and decisionmaking, their involvement also helps sustain public policy reforms long
term. At minimum, the inability of civil rights advocates to transform
court victories in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s into genuine
advancement of social justice on-the-ground should make us wary of
over-reliance on litigation-based, elite-dominated strategies to promote
substantive equality and meaningful opportunity. In The Hollow Hope,
Gerald Rosenberg persuasively argues that implementation constraints
on the judiciary meant that major decisions in areas including

191. Gordon, supra note 190, at 5 (citing Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard
Environmentalism, at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR24.5/sabel.html (Oct./Nov. 1999), at web
page 1).
192. ld. at 4-5.
193. The term "benchmarking" refers to a form of learning by monitoring. It involves the
disciplined pooling of information from multiple local sources with the twin goals of (1)
establishing expectations of what is possible and (2) ultimately bootstrapping or scaling up local
innovations into regional or national reforms that emulate and coordinate best practices. See Dorf
& Sabel, supra note 190, at 287ff; see also Gordon, supra note 190, at 45 (citing, inter alia,
Susan Sturm's analysis of participatory decision-making in the workplace and Archon Fung's
'street level democracy' in the context of school reform and community policing). "Rather than
assigning to government the sole responsibility for establishing and enforcing strict rights, the
new governance model asks the state to facilitate and finance local experimentation with solutions
to complex problems, and then to evaluate and compare the outcomes of the resulting
innovations." Gordon, supra note 190, at 4; see also GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 80, at chs.

4--6.
194. POLLETrA, supra note 187, at 200.
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de-segregation, voting rights, housing, women's rights, and the criminal
justice system were only effective when other important political and
community actors supported those decisions. 195 Rosenberg points out
that civil rights advocates' dependence on the court sapped precious
resources from more direct action forms of advocacy-such as mass
demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, and freedom rides-that were
ultimately more effective vehicles for social change. 196 Even when a
court decision has the capacity to foster far-reaching change without the
support of other political actors, the failure to mobilize rank-and-file
supporters can inhibit effective reform.
Consider the context of
abortion, where Roe v. Wade 197 opened the door for significant social
change by invalidating laws in forty-six states and apparently allowing
private actors to implement the decision without other political
support. 198 Rosenberg demonstrates that, convinced the fight was over,
abortion rights advocates significantly scaled back their activities after
199
Roe, while the decision simultaneously mobilized their opponents.
As a result, in the years following Roe, pressure from anti-abortion
forces meant that few hospitals would provide abortions, and to exercise
their constitutional right to an abortion, hundreds of thousands of
women had to travel great distances and/or face significant harassment
200
from protesters.
The failures that Rosenberg documents took place in a context of a
far more liberal federal judiciary, where advocates were at least able to
win important legal victories in the first place. With many federal
courts now dominated by judges with a very conservative perspective
on the substantive fights at stake, progressives find themselves
less disappointed by implementation failures and more frustrated by
implementation efforts in the other direction. 20 1 Notwithstanding this
shift in the ideology of the federal judiciary, the key point is that elitebased strategies that focus exclusively or even primarily on using courts

195. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
196. Id. at 133, 339.
197. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
198. ROSENBERG, supra note 195, at 175, 195-96.
199. Id. at 188, 339-40.
200. Id. at 195-96.
201. In a recent opinion piece for the New York Times, Bob Herbert pointed out that "[t]he
political right has been relentless in its campaign to control the federal courts, and that campaign
is getting awfully close to an absolute victory. Seven of the 13 circuit courts are already
controlled by Republican appointees, and it is possible that within two years [with more
appointments by President Bush] that control will extend to as many as 12, and maybe all 13
circuits." Bob Herbert, Editorial, The Right Judge?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at A29,
availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
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to achieve social change, even when successful, may change certain
rules temporarily, but do not go far enough to build broad-based support
for those changes to assure their durability.
For example, gay rights activist Tom Stoddard admonishes lawyeractivists to anchor social justice reforms in "culture-shifting" and not
just "rule-shifting" approaches. 20 2 Stoddard encourages those who seek
lasting change to "connect" with the public by "thinking as concertedly
about process as we do about substance." 20 3 Sociologist Francesca
Polletta also concludes that broad-based participation can enable and
sustain a substantive vision. Democratic decision-making, she reports,
helps social movements "build solidarity, innovate tactically, secure the
leverage of political opinion and develop enduring mechanisms of
political accountability. '2 04
Polletta's conclusion that democratic practices help secure
accountability and leverage public opinion is based on her pioneering
study of seven social movements. Similarly, Stoddard's admonition "to
connect" with the public and to pay attention to process as well as
substance resonates with a few key lessons from history. After the
unanimous Supreme Court ruling against constitutionalizing women's
right to vote in Minor v. Happersett,20 5 suffragists launched a massive
social movement that ultimately led to the passage and ratification of
the Nineteenth Amendment. 20 6 In a similar vein, Theda Skocpol
explains that the role of grassroots voluntary associations was crucial in
effecting successful social policies throughout United States history:
"[A] close look reveals how much the development of each policy owes
to social movements and voluntary associations that promoted and
shaped it20 in
partnership with elected politicians and government
7
officials."

202. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 974-77 (1997).
203. Id. at 991.
204. POLLETrA, supra note 187, at viii.
205. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
206. KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 197-218.
207. THEDA SKOCPOL, THE MISSING MIDDLE 32 (2000). Skocpol identifies nineteenth
century public education, Civil War benefits, programs to help mothers and children in the 1910s
and 1920s, the Social Security Act, and the G.I. Bill, as among the country's finest social policy
achievements. She suggests that each of these systems of social support had the following key
features in common: (1)the perception that the program was a return to individuals for service to
the community or a preparation for service; (2) the support of broad cross-class coalitions; (3) the
support of grassroots voluntary organizations; and (4) the availability of public revenues to
support the program. Id. at 25-43.
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Indeed, until we develop political solutions that educate and motivate
people to assume greater moral and political agency, I am quite
skeptical that we will come up with something that can fundamentally
alter the status quo. How do you motivate people to do something
about their situation? You give them hope. You give people a feeling
that they have power to make a difference. But, you can't empower
people in this way if you tell them, "I already have the solution. I
already know what you need. As long as you go along with me, things
will be better."
One great example of this is the contrasting experiences of the AFLCIO and the United Farm Workers ("UFW") in organizing farm
workers in the 1960s and 1970s. Both organizing efforts were designed
to redistribute resources to protect the interests of those doing backbreaking work in the California fields. The AFL-CIO used a top-down
strategy, primarily targeting itinerant white men, for short-term
organizing drives designed to influence sympathetic policy-makers.
The AFL-CIO had little success and essentially withdrew from its
organizing efforts. By contrast, the UFW came up with a very different
strategy designed to mobilize the Mexican and Mexican-American farm
workers who constituted an increasing segment of the labor force.
Drawing upon national, religious and political symbols and practices,
the UFW helped these farm workers gain a sense of dignity
that mobilized them into action. At regular union board or planning
meetings, processes of internal deliberation and the mechanisms of
organizational accountability allowed farm workers to play a major role
in identifying goals and formulating strategies to accomplish them. It
was their power in coming together and working through sustained,
grassroots collective action that led to the well-known grape boycott
and ultimately raised the level of working conditions for these farm
workers.
Thus, when I am talking about democracy, I am really talking about
enabling all the relevant stakeholders to participate in decision-making
processes that shape their lives. And, of course, we cannot achieve this
simply by fixing antiquated voting machines. Although we should all
be troubled when the outcome of a presidential election hinges on the
disproportionate exclusion of black, working-class, and poor voters,
new voting machines will not transform American democracy along the
lines I am proposing. After all, voting is a mechanical approach to
political participation; universal suffrage is necessary but not sufficient
for democracy. Nor is proportional representation itself a panacea. But,
as explained above, PR does tend to foster a much more engaged
democratic citizenry. A well-organized progressive third party could
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have a similar effect. And, probably most important of all, innovative
strategies that draw upon the dynamic energy and problem-solving
capacities of poor people and communities of color-such as Augusto
Boal's theatre of the oppressed and the UFW organizing campaigncould transform our political system to empower stakeholders.
Also note that this vision of democracy will, I hope, result in the
substantive social justice that Professor Seidman and I both worry
about. This is not because I am disingenuously proposing democracy as
a proxy for social justice; rather, it is because my vision of democracy
allows people to play a major role in confronting the problems they
face. The UFW improved living standards for poor Latino farm
workers by involving the farm workers themselves in creating strategies
for change. And this is the point behind the various democratic reforms
I propose: cultivating a more politically engaged populace who would
have the opportunity to participate in democratic processes that affect
their lives.
The preceding discussion not only responds to Professor Seidman's
principal critique that I privilege procedure over substance; I believe it
addresses his four more specific objections to my emphasis on
democracy as well. 2 08 First, Professor Seidman suggests democracy
ignores other legitimating structures. 209
In reality, democracy
illuminates other legitimating structures. Consider the Texas Ten
Percent Plan, where the Hopwood v. Texas 2 10 decision, ending
affirmative action, mobilized a coalition of black and Latino activists to
respond to the illusions of the meritocracy more directly. These
activists ultimately developed new admissions criteria for Texas's
flagship universities that opened up opportunities for students of color
as well as poor whites, and in so doing, they forged new coalitions with
conservative rural legislators.
Professor Seidman also suggests that emphasizing democratic theory
comes at the expense of fighting poverty, homelessness, and other
forms of deprivation. 2 11 In fact, as the experience of the UFW
demonstrates, it is the practice of democracy that facilitates the fight
against these problems by tapping the creative capacities of those most
affected. Of course, Professor Seidman is correct that the farm workers
mobilized around substantive issues that affected their lives. 2 12 But the

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Seidman, supra note 175, at 78-79.
Id.
Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001).
Seidman, supra note 175, at 80, 83.
Id. at 83.
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key point is that the UFW was able to diagnose the problems facing the
farm workers and develop effective solutions because its model-unlike
that of the AFL-CIO-was more democratic to the2 13extent that it
cultivated the participation of the relevant stakeholders.
Third, Professor Seidman argues that democratic engagement is just
not possible without a minimal level of subsistence. 2 14 And, this is true
to a great extent. It is part of why Election Day should become a
national holiday and why reducing the role of money in politics is vital.
It also reveals why democracy is more than voting and certainly more
than holding periodic elections in which fewer and fewer people vote.
Genuine democracy is about organizing relationships so that all people
have the power to play an active role in community decision-making,
and this active role is only possible when people have a minimal level
of subsistence and when the values of community prompt us to provide
for the collective "we" and not just for the individual "me." But the
experience of the UFW demonstrates that democratic practices, which
promote internal deliberation and organizational accountability, can
encourage robust participation even among very poor people, who are
emboldened to define and pursue their collective concerns despite
limited resources. By rehearsing forms of resistance, participants gain
the confidence and the desire to speak out in more public settings.
Similarly, Boal's use of popular theater engaged thousands of
impoverished Brazilians who did not have the time or resources to
organize a political action committee, but who could contribute to
solving the problems that affected their lives when given the
opportunity.
A final criticism that Professor Seidman makes is that I am
unrealistically optimistic and that the reforms I advocate are not going
to happen. 2 15 It is, of course, true that my project requires faith that
transformative change is possible. But from the beginning, all social
movements, including the civil rights movement, have required such
faith. And, while "the forces of retrogress"-as Dr. King called themhave defeated many initiatives to advance equality and social justice,
civil rights advocates have also won amazing victories against
remarkable odds. To illustrate, I'd like to take just one example that is
particularly apt in this context.

213. Marshall Ganz, Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization
of CaliforniaAgriculture, 1959-1966, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1004 (Jan. 2000).
214. Seidman, supra note 175, at 79-80.
215. Id. at 86.
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In December 1964, Dr. King and fellow civil rights advocate Andrew
Young met with top administration officials, including President
Johnson and Vice President Humphrey, to push for a Voting Rights Act
in 1965.216 Their pleas fell on deaf ears. The Vice President told them,
"We passed the civil rights bill only a few months ago. It's too soon."
But black Americans in Selma, Alabama, knew it was anything but too
soon for a Voting Rights Act. Selma is in majority-black Dallas County
where, in 1964, blacks were almost entirely disenfranchised and whites
held all the important political positions. Certainly, in 1964, anyone
suggesting that disenfranchised, poor blacks in Selma, Alabama, would
change the course of American history would have been met with the
response: "it's not going to happen." And yet that is exactly what
happened.
On Sunday, March 7, 1965, an unarmed group of blacks, which
included children and senior citizens, quietly marched across the
Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma en route to the state capital,
Montgomery, to assert their right to vote. The idea for the march came
on the heels of Jimmie Lee Jackson's murder in neighboring Perry
County two weeks earlier. Jackson, a twenty-seven-year-old black
pulpwood cutter, had been shot in the stomach by state troopers on
February 18, after he tried to protect his mother from the clubs of
troopers breaking up a night voter registration vigil. Jackson died a few
days later. At his funeral, attorney and civil rights advocate J.L.
Chestnut remembered people saying, "Goddamn it, we ought to carry
his body over to [then Alabama governor] George Wallace in
Montgomery." These angry sentiments soon evolved into a plan to
walk to Montgomery to petition Wallace for the right to vote.
As the marchers approached the bridge on March 7, the troopers
sounded a two-minute warning. Then, without more than a few
seconds, they attacked. A state trooper's club hit organizer Mrs. Amelia
Boynton on the back of the neck, and she fell to the ground. While she
was regaining consciousness, she heard someone ordering her to get up
and run or she would be tear-gassed. Former United States Senator
Harris Wofford, who came to Selma to join a subsequent march,
described Mrs. Boynton's eyewitness account of what came to be
known as "Bloody Sunday":
Then the tear gas can was dropped next to her head. To a
mounted posse, Sheriff Clark shouted, 'Get those goddamn

216. This account of events surrounding the march from Selma to Montgomery and the
passage of the Voting Rights Act is taken from LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE 169-82
(1998).
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niggers! Get those goddamn white niggers!' and the horsemen
charged with bullwhips. 'Deputies' using the electric cattle prods,
chase[d] the marchers
still on their feet all the way back to
2 17
Brown's Chapel.
Films of the event resembled a battle scene, with bombs, smoke, and
mass chaos. There was widespread public concern after video clips
were shown on national television, interrupting an ABC Sunday night
special, Judgment at Nuremberg.
Within five months, President Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, ensuring that black Americans had the right to vote for the first
time since Reconstruction. Johnson later admitted that they passed the
1965 Voting Rights Act
on a bridge on March 7, 1965, heading from
2 18
Selma to Montgomery.
V.

CONCLUSION

Consistent with the original terms of our democracy, the debacle in
Florida and its unseemly denouement at the hands of our highest court
were surprisingly inevitable. They grew from the seeds planted early on
in our history in which the capacity of the many was compromised to
protect the rights of the few. If we want to build a democracy upon a set
of more participatory and egalitarian premises, we have to come to
terms with the legacy of slavery as it has shaped our fundamentally
unfair current political structures. But we also must let go of notions
that a more liberal or egalitarian sounding elite can be trusted with this
task. The idea of democracy is the idea that the people shall rule.
Draping elitism in meritocratic clothing does not a democracy make.
This is not about changing the couture of democracy to a more
pedestrian soft brown-toned wardrobe. This is about embracing a
fundamentally participatory role for the people themselves. We will
know we have shifted paradigms when the grandsons and great
granddaughters of former slaves assume their rightful place, not just as
token members of a ruling elite but as respected members of a
democratic polity where votes are counted, voices are heard, and people
are encouraged to participate even after the election. As Henry
Wiencek writes in the New York Times:
This country was founded upon a bargain for which we continue to
pay the price. We compound the mistake by draping a veil of
innocence over the transaction. The true beneficiary of the presentism
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defense is not the past but the present-it guards2 19and preserves our
fervent wish to have sprung from innocent origins.
Black Americans understand this all too well, and they therefore have
much to contribute to the re-invigoration of our democracy.
There are contrasting approaches to democracy that have, as yet,
untapped potential to create something egalitarian, issue-oriented, and
participatory through innovation and collaboration, both among the
people and between people and their representatives. Not only is this
presumably the normative goal of democracy, it is a model that has been
adapted to at least some degree by many nations throughout the world.
It is not implausible to imagine such alternative forms finding their way
to our shores. Such an outcome depends upon our coming together to
create a vibrant multi-party democracy that considers the voices of the
losers as well as the winners, and that builds toward a society governed
by a vigorous combination of ideas and engaged citizens rather than an
entrenched oligarchy dependent upon pedigree, paper credentials, or
money.

219. Henry Wiencek, Editorial, Yale and the Price of Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2001, at
A15, availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.

